Liberal Intergovernmentalism in the Councils of the EU: A Baseline Theory?

Abstract

How has the research on the European Council and the Council of the EU engaged with Moravcsik's theory on liberal intergovernmentalism (LI)? This article analyzes 25 years of Council research. Most of this literature does not refer to LI, and a majority of the references that are made raise critique against LI. However, compared to other major works on European integration, LI is by far the most important source in the Council literature. Furthermore, a closer look at the most significant challenges raised against LI indicates that its account of intergovernmental bargaining in the EU is not in serious question. On the other hand, few studies provide systematic tests of the key assumptions of LI with regards to interstate bargaining. As a result, the self‐proclaimed status of LI as a baseline theory is confirmed in the Council literature more by implicit, somewhat reluctant, consent than by overt support.

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Preferences, Preference Formation and Position Taking in a Eurozone Out: Lessons from the United Kingdom

“…The positions taken by governments in response to the eurozone crisis provide an important testing ground for competing theoretical approaches to preference formation. Although liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) remains the ‘baseline theory’ for many (Naurin, 2018), critics highlight as problematic its assumption that the domestic arena is insular and emphasise the influence of the wider EU context and shared EU norms in shaping national preferences (Csehi and Puetter, 2017; Hall, 2012; Schirm, 2016, 2018; Zimmermann, 2014). Yet, the role of top officeholders or institutions in deciding national responses to the eurozone crisis has not yet been fully explored.…”