Liberals, the Irish Famine and the role of the state

Abstract

The Irish mythology of the Great Famine of the 1840s explained the failure of the British government to prevent the deaths of some one million people in terms of a Whig government and ruling élite driven by a commitment to laissez-faire ideology which left them indifferent to the loss of Irish lives. At its most extreme, this mythology attributed a wilful genocide to the English. The term myth as used here does not necessarily imply that the account is untrue. Rather, the myth comprises a combination of fact, fiction and the unknowable in a narrative of such power that, for the people who accept it, the myth provides a guide to future understanding and action. In this respect, Irish mythology about the English and the Famine is rooted in facts: the resistance of the Whig government to any interference with the market; the staunch commitment to ideology of central figures in the making of famine policy such as Charles Trevelyan (assistant secretary to the treasury) and Sir Charles Wood (chancellor of the exchequer) and shapers of liberal opinion such as the political economists Nassau Senior and James Wilson (editor of The Economist); and the indifference to Irish suffering, and indeed the hostility to the Irish, as demonstrated in the language of the radical M.P.J.A. Roebuck.

“That Coming Storm”: The Irish Poor Law, Colonial Biopolitics, and the Great Famine

“…It is still commonly and unproblematically asserted that mortality levels during the Great Famine were the result of economic laissez-faire-ism, interpreted almost exclusively as a policy of nonintervention (Daly 1986;Bernstein 1995). It is argued here, however, that there exists an important and overlooked tension between economic liberalism and social interventionism.…”

‘Nothing Less than its Eradication'? Ireland'S Hunger Task Force and the Production of Hunger

“…see Nally, 2008). Despite reports of desperate conditions in Ireland, leading British politicians rejected imposing restrictions on food exports and out of fear of disrupting 'market forces' (see also Bernstein, 1995), the British state refused to purchase sufficient quantities of food on the international market to extend support to the hungry. Other state interventions in Ireland -such as to feed the hungry via public works programs -were also frowned upon and limited by the British government.…”