2012
DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2012.749629
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Libya's Lessons: The Air Campaign

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Even though the 2011 intervention Libya has not previously been subjected to systematic, within-case study, there are a substantial number of analyses that cover NATO's conduct of the air campaign from organizational, political, and military perspectives (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012;Gaub, 2013;Greenleaf, 2013;Mueller, 2015a). While the main mandate of the air campaign was protection of civilians and the establishment of a no-fly zone, NATO airpower was instrumental not only in preventing NTC defeat, but also in facilitating its eventual-and initially somewhat unexpected-victory over Gaddafi (Barry, 2011;Barrie, 2012;Wehrey, 2015, Mueller, 2015b. Furthermore, Operation Unified Protector was not a "shock and awe" campaign intended to paralyze the Libyan government, but an effort to "level the playing field" for the rebels, often through dynamic targeting on the battlefield (Greenleaf, 2013: 46;Chivvis, 2015: 29;Mueller, 2015b).…”
Section: Case Selection and Research Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Even though the 2011 intervention Libya has not previously been subjected to systematic, within-case study, there are a substantial number of analyses that cover NATO's conduct of the air campaign from organizational, political, and military perspectives (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012;Gaub, 2013;Greenleaf, 2013;Mueller, 2015a). While the main mandate of the air campaign was protection of civilians and the establishment of a no-fly zone, NATO airpower was instrumental not only in preventing NTC defeat, but also in facilitating its eventual-and initially somewhat unexpected-victory over Gaddafi (Barry, 2011;Barrie, 2012;Wehrey, 2015, Mueller, 2015b. Furthermore, Operation Unified Protector was not a "shock and awe" campaign intended to paralyze the Libyan government, but an effort to "level the playing field" for the rebels, often through dynamic targeting on the battlefield (Greenleaf, 2013: 46;Chivvis, 2015: 29;Mueller, 2015b).…”
Section: Case Selection and Research Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Primarily, it is not possible to rule out a short-term effect on the government's power to target the rebels, or a long-term effect on its power to resist, as such contributions may have hinged on non-systematic effects and factors that are difficult to capture with the methods employed here. For example, the destruction of a large government armored force outside Benghazi—a crucial target of the government's counteroffensive—on 19–20 March is believed to have prevented a complete rebel collapse (Barrie, 2012: 57; Chivvis, 2012: 72; Mueller, 2015b). These kinds of pivotal battlefield events are important, but challenging to capture through systematic analysis.…”
Section: The 2011 Libyan Civil War and Operation Unified Protectormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ubicación de los objetivos atacados durante la Operación Odyssey Dawn, a corte 25 de marzo de 2011 Fuente: U. S. Department of Defense (2011) http://archive.defense.gov/news/d20110328slides1.pdf Abril a agosto: Fuerte ofensiva de la otan y éxitos de la revolución al occidente Abril inicia con el nacimiento de la Operación Protector Unificado bajo el comando de la otan, por tanto, la coordinación entre los miembros de la coalición se facilita gracias a los canales ya existentes dentro de la alianza. Los esfuerzos de la organización se enfocaron en una fuerte campaña aérea en apoyo a la maniobra terrestre de los rebeldes, que buscaban derrotar a las fuerzas regulares mejor entrenadas y equipadas (Barrie, 2012). A pesar de lo simple que parece este postulado, el desempeño en combate de las fuerzas antigadafistas fue duramente cuestionado, pues el éxito operacional obtenido no era proporcional al apoyo brindado por la coalición.…”
Section: Febrero Y Marzo De 2011: La Revolución Desde El Esteunclassified