Abstract:Licensed Shared Access (LSA) is a complementary solution allowing Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to use another incumbent's frequency spectrum after obtaining a proper license from the regulator.Using auctions to allocate those LSA-type licenses is a natural approach toward an efficient use of spectrum, by controlling the incentives for MNOs to declare their true valuation for the spectrum and allocating it to those who value it the most. A specificity of LSA licenses lies in the interactions among buyers, du… Show more
“…In the second version, we remove those representatives so that the auction will be between the auctioneer and bidders. This is an extension of our work in [8].…”
Section: Adapting the Clinching Approach To Lsamentioning
confidence: 55%
“…The difference between those two quantities is then (C VCG h,n − j∈g h \i b j,n ). We now prove that the proposed mechanism with allocation given in (8) and payment given in ( 9) is truthful. Let us first introduce the two following lemmas.…”
Section: Paymentsmentioning
confidence: 78%
“…Authors of LSAA claim that LSAA is truthful. However, it is not the case as we have shown in [6], and in [27] we have proposed two variants that are truthful: TLSAA and TLSAA2. Both mechanisms compute the group-bid of each group in the same way as LSAA, however TLSAA is more efficient than LSAA, with a lower revenue.…”
Section: Tlsaa and Tlsaa2mentioning
confidence: 97%
“…LSAA [7] is the first auction mechanism which was proposed as a candidate for the LSA context, it performs well in terms of social welfare assuming truthtelling by bidders, but sincere bidding is not an optimal strategy for bidders. In [8], we modified the payment rule of LSAA to make it truthful. For those works there are two limitations:…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Proposition 1. For the proposed mechanism with allocation rule in (8) and payment rule in (9), truthful bidding, is a dominant strategy i.e., for each bidder i, proposing (b i,1 , .., b i,K ) = (v i,n , .., v i,K ) maximizes its utility.…”
Licensed Shared Access (LSA) is a new concept proposed by the radio spectrum policy group in order to optimize spectrum usage: a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) can access temporarily to other incumbent's spectrum after obtaining a license. The licensing process is made via an auction mechanism. The mechanisms proposed in the literature for the LSA context are oneshot auction mechanisms which allocate all the available spectrum as a unique block. In this paper, we first show how to increase the performance of those auctions (in terms of revenue, efficiency and fairness of the allocation) while preserving truthful bidding, by splitting spectrum and converting single block auctions into multi-block auctions. Simulation results illustrate how appropriately choosing the number of blocks allows to increase the aforementioned metrics. Second, we show how to convert one-shot mechanisms to equivalent ascending mechanisms (in terms of allocations and payments) so that we add transparency and privacy to the auction.
“…In the second version, we remove those representatives so that the auction will be between the auctioneer and bidders. This is an extension of our work in [8].…”
Section: Adapting the Clinching Approach To Lsamentioning
confidence: 55%
“…The difference between those two quantities is then (C VCG h,n − j∈g h \i b j,n ). We now prove that the proposed mechanism with allocation given in (8) and payment given in ( 9) is truthful. Let us first introduce the two following lemmas.…”
Section: Paymentsmentioning
confidence: 78%
“…Authors of LSAA claim that LSAA is truthful. However, it is not the case as we have shown in [6], and in [27] we have proposed two variants that are truthful: TLSAA and TLSAA2. Both mechanisms compute the group-bid of each group in the same way as LSAA, however TLSAA is more efficient than LSAA, with a lower revenue.…”
Section: Tlsaa and Tlsaa2mentioning
confidence: 97%
“…LSAA [7] is the first auction mechanism which was proposed as a candidate for the LSA context, it performs well in terms of social welfare assuming truthtelling by bidders, but sincere bidding is not an optimal strategy for bidders. In [8], we modified the payment rule of LSAA to make it truthful. For those works there are two limitations:…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Proposition 1. For the proposed mechanism with allocation rule in (8) and payment rule in (9), truthful bidding, is a dominant strategy i.e., for each bidder i, proposing (b i,1 , .., b i,K ) = (v i,n , .., v i,K ) maximizes its utility.…”
Licensed Shared Access (LSA) is a new concept proposed by the radio spectrum policy group in order to optimize spectrum usage: a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) can access temporarily to other incumbent's spectrum after obtaining a license. The licensing process is made via an auction mechanism. The mechanisms proposed in the literature for the LSA context are oneshot auction mechanisms which allocate all the available spectrum as a unique block. In this paper, we first show how to increase the performance of those auctions (in terms of revenue, efficiency and fairness of the allocation) while preserving truthful bidding, by splitting spectrum and converting single block auctions into multi-block auctions. Simulation results illustrate how appropriately choosing the number of blocks allows to increase the aforementioned metrics. Second, we show how to convert one-shot mechanisms to equivalent ascending mechanisms (in terms of allocations and payments) so that we add transparency and privacy to the auction.
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