Licensing Contract in a Stackelberg Model*

Filippini, Luigi

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2005.00465.x

Cited by 63 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…This literature started by Tauman (1984, 1986) and Shapiro (1985, 1986) who analyzed licensing in standard oligopoly models. Later studies expanded the analysis by considering general two-part tariff policies (Sen and Tauman 2007), models with differentiated goods (Muto 1993, Faulí-Oller andSandonís 2002), asymmetric information (Gallini andWright 1990, Beggs 1992), incumbent innovators (Shapiro 1985, Marjit 1990, Wang 1998, Kamien and Tauman 2002, strategic delegation (Mukherjee 2001, Saracho 2002, Stackelberg leadership (Kabiraj 2004, Filippini 2005, moral hazard (Choi 2001), or the integer problem (Sen 2005), etc.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patent Licensing, Bargaining, and Product Positioning

Matsumura

Matsushima

2010

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractInnovators who have developed advanced technologies, along with launching new products by themselves, often license these technologies to their rivals. When a firm launches a new product, product positioning is also an important matter. Using a standard linear city model with two firms, we investigate how the bargaining power of the licenser affects the product positions of the firms. We find that the inventor more likely chooses the central position when its bargaining power is weak. We also discuss the welfare implication. We find that the inverse U shape relationship between the bargaining power of the licenser and total social surplus, i.e., neither too strong nor too weak bargaining power of the licensor is optimal.JEL classification: L13, O32, R32

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patent Licensing, Bargaining, and Product Positioning

Matsumura

Matsushima

2010

SSRN Journal

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“…Comparing licensing by means of upfront fees (which may be collected via an auction) and royalties, the early literature concluded that licensing by means of upfront fees dominates royalty licensing for an outside innovator (Kamien & Tauman, 1984;Kamien & Tauman, 1986;Kamien, et al, 1992). As royalties are frequently observed in practice, the conclusion on the suboptimality of royalty licensing generated a number of papers that argued that royalties can be explained by factors, such as informational asymmetry (Gallini & Wright, 1990;Rockett, 1990;Sen, 2005a), product differentiation (Muto, 1993;Wang & Yang, 1999;Poddar & Sinha, 2004), leadership structure (Kabiraj, 2004;Kabiraj, 2005;Filippini, 2005), or by the fact that the number of licenses must be an integer (Sen, 2005b). There is a small literature that considers issues of international trade in the context of technology transfer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entry and technology transfer in a Cournot model

2010

CBR

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This work studies entry and technology transfer in a Cournot model where there are two domestic firms. A foreign firm has a patent on a technological innovation that reduces the costs of all firms. The foreign firm can license the innovation to one or both domestic firms. The authors consider two standard licensing policies: (1) auction policy and (2) unit royalty policy. The foreign firm can license the innovation either by staying outside the domestic market, or it can enter the market, license the innovation and compete with the domestic firms. The authors show that (1) when the foreign firm stays outside, it is never optimal for it to use royalties, (2) if it licenses the innovation by entering the industry, then royalties could be optimal and (3) when it decides on its entry strategy by taking its optimal licensing policies into account, it always finds it optimal to enter the domestic market.

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“…Kamien and Tauman (1986) shows that if the licensor lacks production capacity, a fixed fee is better than a royalty, and is also better for consumers. This topic is addressed under Stackelberg oligopoly both when a licensor has production capacity (Wang and Yang (2004); Kabiraj (2005);Filippini (2005)) and when it lacks production capacity (Kabiraj (2004)). La Manna (1993) analyzes a Cournot oligopoly with a fixed fee under cost asymmetry, and shows that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower-cost firm always has an incentive to transfer its technology.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Subsidizing New Technology Adoption in a Stackelberg Duopoly: Cases of Substitutes and Complements

Hattori

Tanaka

2016

Ital Econ J

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Economic growth requires that firms adopt new technologies. However, it may be insufficient in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this case, a government subsidy is necessary. We present an analysis of firms' adoption of new technology and government subsidization policy in a Stackelberg duopoly with differentiated goods. The technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed set-up cost, such as training employees. There are several cases related to optimal policies depending on the set-up costs and whether the goods are substitutes or complements. In particular, there are two cases.1. Social welfare is maximized when only the Stackelberg leader adopts the new technology, but no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the government should subsidize only the leader, which is a discriminatory policy. (Case 5 of Theorem 1 and Case 3-(1)-ii of Theorem 2) 2. Social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt the new technology, but only the leader adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the government should subsidize only the follower. This policy is not discriminatory because adoption is the dominant strategy for the leader. (Case 2 of Theorem 1)

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Licensing Contract in a Stackelberg Model*

Cited by 63 publications

References 12 publications

Patent Licensing, Bargaining, and Product Positioning

Patent Licensing, Bargaining, and Product Positioning

Entry and technology transfer in a Cournot model

Subsidizing New Technology Adoption in a Stackelberg Duopoly: Cases of Substitutes and Complements

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