Lies, Common Ground and Performative Utterances

Marsili, Neri

doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00368-4

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…In the joint attention, the commitment made by a speaker suggests his/her knowledge about the world. Such knowledge contributes to the structuring of the common ground 5 in developing the size of local dialogue ( Stalnaker, 2002 ; Abbott, 2008 ; Kecskes and Zhang, 2009 , 2013 ; Allan, 2013 ; Green, 2017 ; Semeijn, 2017 ; Swanson, 2020 ; Marsili, 2021 ). Particularly, according to Kecskes and Zhang (2009 , p.347), there are two sides to common ground: core common ground and emergent common ground .…”

Section: Interactive Embodimentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint attention and its linguistic representation in dialogue: embodiment revisited

Zeng

2023

Front. Psychol.

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Lakoff and Johnson, among many others, have discussed the role of the human body in structuring meaning in communication, aiming to reveal the interrelation between the human body, language, and cognition. This study revisits the concept of embodiment and investigates its interactive nature functioning in speakers constructing repeated structures in conversation, based on the hypothesis made in this work that the joint attention of interlocutors essentially indicates the interaction of their embodied experience of the language used in the situated context, where speakers not only share their propositional commitments but also make individual contributions to establishing common ground in dialogue. Viewed in this way, at the linguistic level, the implicitly and/or explicitly repeated language resources displayed between utterances are in fact the encoding of speakers’ co-construction of joint attention and demonstrate the interplay of speakers’ syntactic and pragmatic knowledge in producing utterances in the talk turns. This research hopefully sheds some light on studies concerning the relationship between language and cognition as well as how language is constructed in dialogue from the interactive view of the syntax–pragmatics interface.

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Section: Interactive Embodimentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint attention and its linguistic representation in dialogue: embodiment revisited

Zeng

2023

Front. Psychol.

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“…At least by many accounts of explicit performatives, for a detailed discussion see, e.g.,Marsili (2021).32 This is supported by the criterion thatStokke (2018, 66) proposes, i.e., he suggests that we can test whether a particular proposition has been added to the common ground by asking whether it can be correctly presupposed. For instance, before uttering (22), Harry can correctly presuppose that John owns a Mercedes since this information already belongs to the common ground.…”

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confidence: 96%

Lying with Uninformative Speech Acts

Gaszczyk

2022

Can. J. of Philosophy

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I propose an analysis of lying with uninformative speech acts. The orthodox view states that lying is restricted to assertions. However, the growing case for non-assertoric lies made by presuppositions or conventional implicatures challenges this orthodoxy. So far, the only presuppositions to have been considered as lies were informative presuppositions. In fact, uninformative lies were not discussed in the philosophical literature. However, limiting the possibility of lying to informative speech acts is too restrictive. Firstly, I show that standard, uninformative presuppositions can also be lies. Secondly, I extend this picture into uninformative lies made by declarative statements. To implement my proposal, I do not need a new definition of lying. Recently popular commitment-based definitions of lying are able to properly handle uninformative lies.

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“…Lying is a concept deeply ingrained in ordinary conversations and one would need a really good reason to depart from folk intuitions connected with this notion. No such reason has been offered yet, so we are after a descriptive definition of lying, which reflects the ordinary understanding, rather than a revisionary one (see Fallis, 2010 ; Marsili, 2023a ).…”

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Don’t be deceived: bald-faced lies are deceitful assertions

Rudnicki

Odrowąż‐Sypniewska

2023

Synthese

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The traditional conception of lying, according to which to lie is to make an assertion with an intention to deceive the hearer, has recently been put under pressure by the phenomenon of bald-faced lies i.e. utterances that prima facie look like lies but because of their blatancy allegedly lack the accompanying intention to deceive. In this paper we propose an intuitive way of reconciling the phenomenon of bald-faced lies with the traditional conception by suggesting that the existing analyses of the phenomenon overlook a non-obvious category of hearers whom the speakers of bald-faced lies intend to deceive. Those hearers are institutions represented by the people involved, such as courts or secret police. We also criticize two recent rival accounts (Jessica Keiser’s and Daniel Harris’s) that attempt to save the traditional conception by saying that some bald-faced lies are not assertions, because they are conventional—rather than illocutionary—speech acts.

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Lies, Common Ground and Performative Utterances

Cited by 10 publications

References 39 publications

Joint attention and its linguistic representation in dialogue: embodiment revisited

Joint attention and its linguistic representation in dialogue: embodiment revisited

Lying with Uninformative Speech Acts

Don’t be deceived: bald-faced lies are deceitful assertions

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