Life as a Homeostatic Property Cluster

Diéguez, Antonio

doi:10.1007/s13752-012-0052-4

Cited by 26 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Of course, not every theory of the origin is equally favoured, and some would consider metabolism-first theories to be wrong precisely because said entities could not undergo Darwinian evolution. But, as has been astutely pointed out, such a conclusion presupposes that living things must be capable of this (Diéguez 2013). Given that the puzzle of the origins remains unsettled, we do not want a definition to constrain our hypotheses on the matter.…”

Section: Counter-examples Borderline Cases Operativity and Theoretmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”

Ruiz

Umerez

2018

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Despite many attempts to achieve an adequate definition of living systems by means of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, the opinion that such an enterprise is inexorably destined to fail is increasingly gaining support. However, we believe options do not just come down to either having faith in a future success or endorsing skepticism. In this paper, we aim to redirect the discussion of the problem by shifting the focus of attention from strict definitions (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) towards a philosophical framework that allows conceiving of living systems as a natural kind, but whereby natural kinds are not to be defined by fixed necessary and sufficient conditions. We argue for a property-cluster kind approach according to which living systems constitute a natural kind with vague boundaries, capable of changing, and whose members do not need to instantiate every property. We draw from Boyd's homeostatic property-cluster theory and introduce two modifications, one regarding homeostatic mechanisms and another related to the scientific role of kinds. Thus, our view overcomes some difficulties of Boyd's theory and we are able to account for the natural kindhood of living things. We also emphasize the most appealing features of our approach for specific research fields and address three objections to this sort of approach.

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Section: Counter-examples Borderline Cases Operativity and Theoretmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”

Ruiz

Umerez

2018

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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“…There is a widespread understanding that HPC theory (or other philosophical views with the main characteristics of HPC) is better prepared to deal with classification practices in biological sciences, as shown by the multiple applications of it in the philosophy of biology literature. Apart from species (Boyd 1988;1989;1991;1999a;1999b;Keller, Boyd & Wheeler 2003;Wilson 2005;Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007), other biological categories argued to constitute cluster kinds include higher taxa (Rieppel 2005b), cell types (Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007;Slater 2013), ecosystems (Slater 2018), life (Diéguez 2013; Ferreira Ruiz and Umerez 2018), homologies (Rieppel 2005a;Brigandt 2002), developmental modules (Rieppel 2005a), and genes (Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007). Yet some philosophers have criticized HPC (and/or related views).…”

Section: Natural Kinds In Contemporary Philosophy: Micro-essentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

How not to Resist the Natural Kind Talk in Biology

Ruiz

2019

quadfia

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After the dawn of the traditional, essentialist view of natural kinds in contemporary philosophy (exacerbated in philosophy of biology by "population thinking"), non-essentialist cluster conceptions of natural kinds have been extensively supported and applied to numerous biological categories. However, salient philosophers have put forward two challenging arguments against cluster kind theories. I argue that, in both cases, discontent with a cluster conception of natural kinds is motivated by tacit and previous assumptions that can be challenged. I conclude that the concerns expressed in the objections do not make good reasons to resist natural kinds talk in biology unless one is willing to share such commitments and assumptions with respect to natural kinds. Ultimately, the discussion can be used to point out that our very expectations regarding natural kinds theories could use a rethink.

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“…There is a widespread understanding that HPC theory (or other philosophical views with the main characteristics of HPC) is better prepared to deal with classification practices in biological sciences, as shown by the multiple applications of it in the philosophy of biology literature. Apart from species (Boyd 1988;1991;1999a;1999b;Keller, Boyd & Wheeler 2003;Wilson 2005;Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007), other biological categories argued to constitute cluster kinds include higher taxa (Rieppel 2005b), cell types (Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007;Slater 2013), ecosystems (Slater 2018), life (Diéguez 2013; Ferreira Ruiz and Umerez 2018), homologies (Rieppel 2005a;Brigandt 2002), developmental modules (Rieppel 2005a), and genes (Wilson, Barker and Brigandt 2007). Yet some philosophers have criticized HPC (and/or related views).…”

Section: Natural Kinds In Contemporary Philosophy: Micro-essentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quaderns de filosofia VI, 1

Fia¹

2019

quadfia

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It is commonly assumed that the concept of mechanism is a keytool for the scientific understanding of observable phenomena. However, there is no single definition of mechanism in the current philosophy of science. In fact, philosophers have developed several characterizations of what seemed to be a clear intuitive concept for scientists. In this paper, I will analyze these philosophical conceptions of mechanism, highlighting their problematic aspects and proposing a new mechanistic approach based on the idea that the pertinent levels of organization for a mechanistic explanation can be identified with intervals of quasi-decompositionality. I argue that this approach allows us to consider that activities are directly derived from the entities' structure. Consequently, a mechanistic explanation implies an arbitrary but not capricious choice of an organizational level. According to this approach, interlevel causation is merely apparent and there is no place for emergent properties.

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Life as a Homeostatic Property Cluster

Cited by 26 publications

References 27 publications

“Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”

“Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”

How not to Resist the Natural Kind Talk in Biology

Quaderns de filosofia VI, 1

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