Limited-trust equilibria

Murray, Timothy; Garg, Jugal; Nagi, Rakesh

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2020.07.009

Cited by 5 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…The player will play myopically and tend to adopt the product that maximizes its instantaneous utility. However, as pointed out in [20], such a decision process could not explain the phenomenon where individuals aim to maximize their long-term utility and make choices that do not benefit their short-term payoff. Therefore, we take this higher level of rationality into consideration and set up the diffusion dynamics based on the concept of LTE.…”

Section: Diffusion Dynamics Under Limited-trust Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That motivates studying the diffusion process based on a different notion of rationality. [20] has recently introduced a new concept of equilibrium named limited-trust equilibrium (LTE), where each individual is willing to sacrifice a certain amount of short-term utility in order to get benefited more over the long run, provided that its limited sacrifice improves the social utility by at least that much. Results in [30] show that the utility of individuals can indeed increase if the agents adopt such trustworthy behavior.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The NE could not provide a reasonable explanation for this everyday phenomenon. The authors in [20] have introduced a new concept of equilibrium named limited-trust equilibrium (LTE). As opposed to the NE, where individuals play rationally to maximize their short-term utilities, under the LTE, an agent aims to maximize its longterm utility by trusting the others and giving up a certain amount of utility so that the others gain considerably more than what that agent loses, hoping that the others will return that favor in the future.…”

Section: A Limited-trust Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Like NE, one can show that LTE exists in every n-player finite game with positive trust limits. In particular, computation of LTE in general is PPAD-hard [20].…”

Section: A Limited-trust Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, we focus on a game-theoretic model for diffusion dynamics. More precisely, we consider the diffusion of innovation based on the notion of limited-trust equilibrium (LTE) [20] over social networks. The LTE is a novel notion of equilibrium based on an individual's rationality on short-term and long-term utilities, as opposed to the Nash equilibrium (NE), which solely accounts for an individual's short-term utility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Limited-Trust in Diffusion of Competing Alternatives over Social Networks

León¹,

Etesami²,

Nagi³

2022

Preprint

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We consider the diffusion of innovation in social networks using a game-theoretic approach. Each individual plays a coordination game with its neighbors and decides what alternative product to adopt to maximize its payoff. As products are used in conjunction with others and through repeated interactions, individuals are more interested in their long-term benefits and tend to show trustworthiness to others to maximize their long-term payoffs. To capture such trustworthy behavior, we deviate from the expected utility theory and use a new notion of rationality based on limited-trust equilibrium (LTE). By incorporating such notion into the diffusion model, we analyze the convergence of emerging dynamics to their equilibrium points using a mean-field approximation. We study the equilibrium state and the convergence rate of the diffusion process using the absorption probability and the expected absorption time of a reduced-size absorbing Markov chain. We also show that the LTE diffusion model under the best-response strategy can be converted to the well-known linear threshold model. Simulations show that when agents behave trustworthily, their long-term payoffs will increase significantly compared to the case when they are solely self-interested. Moreover, the Markov chain analysis provides a good estimation of the convergence property over random networks.

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Section: Diffusion Dynamics Under Limited-trust Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Limited-trust Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Like NE, one can show that LTE exists in every n-player finite game with positive trust limits. In particular, computation of LTE in general is PPAD-hard [20].…”

Section: A Limited-trust Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Limited-Trust in Diffusion of Competing Alternatives over Social Networks

León¹,

Etesami²,

Nagi³

2022

Preprint

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Limited trust in social network games

Murray,

Garg,

Nagi

2024

Phys. Rev. E

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Diffusion of Innovation under Limited-Trust Equilibrium

León

Etesami

Nagi

2022

2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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We consider online reinforcement learning in episodic Markov decision process (MDP) with an unknown transition matrix and stochastic rewards drawn from a fixed but unknown distribution. The learner aims to learn the optimal policy and minimize their regret over a finite time horizon through interacting with the environment. We devise a simple and efficient model-based algorithm that achieves O(LX √ T A) regret with high probability, where L is the episode length, T is the number of episodes, and X and A are the cardinalities of the state space and the action space, respectively. The proposed algorithm, which is based on the concept of "optimism in the face of uncertainty", maintains confidence sets of transition and reward functions and uses occupancy measures to connect the online MDP with linear programming. It achieves a tighter regret bound compared to the existing works that use a similar confidence sets framework and improves the computational effort compared to those that use a different framework but with a slightly tighter regret bound.

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Limited-trust equilibria

Cited by 5 publications

References 28 publications

Limited-Trust in Diffusion of Competing Alternatives over Social Networks

Limited-Trust in Diffusion of Competing Alternatives over Social Networks

Limited trust in social network games

Diffusion of Innovation under Limited-Trust Equilibrium

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