2022
DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10321-9
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Linguistic Interventions and the Ethics of Conceptual Disruption

Abstract: Several authors in psychology and philosophy have recently raised the following question: when is it permissible to intentionally change the meaning and use of our words and concepts? I argue that an arguably prior question has received much less attention: Even if there were good moral or epistemic reasons for conceptual or semantic changes, this does not yet justify pushing or lobbying for such changes if they are socially and conceptually disruptive. In this paper, I develop the beginnings of an ethics of c… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…These include harms that are not directly concerned with one's physical state of being (e.g., privacy violations), potential shifts in societal practices (e.g., changes in the relative weight of health solidarity in public health debates), and, linking to recent work on social and conceptual disruption (cf. [74][75][76], changes in how concepts related to health and disease are understood.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These include harms that are not directly concerned with one's physical state of being (e.g., privacy violations), potential shifts in societal practices (e.g., changes in the relative weight of health solidarity in public health debates), and, linking to recent work on social and conceptual disruption (cf. [74][75][76], changes in how concepts related to health and disease are understood.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Imagine a prehistoric community that discovers how to modify a stone such that it can better be used as a hammer. The new artifact might not immediately be classified by the current model because we lack the necessary conceptual structure to make sense of it (Hopster, 2021; Löhr, 2022). We have a model for stones and their different possible properties but perhaps no model or set of priors for thinking about stone as a hammer.…”
Section: Ce As Model Assessment Revision and Enactmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, we are usually struck by a problem with our conceptual system, say, an inconsistency or conceptual gap. These “conceptual disruptions” (Löhr, 2022) can be prompted, for example, by the introduction of a new technological artifact that generates uncertainty about which concepts to apply or “how to go on” (Wittgenstein, 2010, §151). When reflecting on the disruptions, we then identify the conditions that led to them.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conceptual disruptions may give rise to conceptual changes, but this need not always be the case (Löhr, 2022). In fact, technological pressures may also give impetus to conceptual preservation (Lindauer, 2020).…”
Section: Types Of Conceptual Disruptionsmentioning
confidence: 99%