“…Chang and Lai (2002), by using a principal-agent model, showed that if bribery rate within the firm is high, social norms existing outside the company can no longer serve as a sufficient sanction against a corrupt supervisor, and an effective policy for deterring workers' slack is to pay a higher wage to supervisors rather than to workers. In addition to this, institutional explanation of the corruption phenomenon is explicitly concerned with the relationships among individuals, organizations, communities, and societies they operate in (Pillay & Dorasamy, 2010). Finally, among other microeconomic determinants, Zahra, Priem, and Rasheed (2005) based on prior researches, argue that industry characteristics such as industry cultures, norms and histories; investment horizons, payback periods, and financial returns; industry concentration; environmental hostility; environmental dynamism and environmental heterogeneity affect the likelihood of corruption significantly.…”