Linking Performance and Collective Action—the Case of the Office du Niger Irrigation Scheme in Mali

Abstract

Increasing irrigation efficiency in irrigation schemes has always been high on the agenda of policy makers. Despite quite some 'social' experiments, whereby large portions of management were carried over to the farmer level, results often remained disappointing. This paper explores why this came about for a case study in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme in Mali. Since Irrigation Management Transfer, farmers are responsible for the tertiary level, but collective action for water management remains below expectations. This paper applies an analytical framework based on the conceptual model developed by van Noordwijk et al. (Conserv Ecol 5:21, 2002) and proceeding in two steps. Firstly, an interview-based stakeholder analysis assesses the objectives and mental models of farmers and the central management regarding water management. It appears from the interviews that the central management wants to increase irrigation efficiency through fully-fledged collective action, whereas farmers value the latter only when it favours easy irrigation. Secondly, the relation between collective action and performance was tested through a field study on a sample of 36 tertiary blocks. Results indicate that only collective action at the inlet of the tertiary canal, currently implemented on less than a third of the tertiary blocks, increases irrigation efficiency (with 14%). Collective action for water allocation is implemented within almost three quarters of tertiary blocks and effectively reduces irrigation problems. However, if they lack the necessary social capital, not all farmers can establish collective action when needed. Based on this analysis, the paper proposes a mix of incentives and measures to resolve the conflict between farmers and the central management to their mutual benefit.

A remote sensing-based irrigation performance assessment: a case study of the Office du Niger in Mali

“…Table 3 Total area cultivated with rice in la Saison, and the averages (l) of actual evapotranspiration, estimated fresh rice yields and water productivity for the Office du Niger as a whole, the five administrative zones and for the casiers located in the Niono zone Rice area (ha) Actual evapotranspiration (mm) Estimated rice yield (ton ha The standard deviation (r) and the coefficient of variation (c v ) for each parameter are presented also Irrig Sci (2010) 28:371-385 379 The c v of water consumption in the Office du Niger equals 0.092 (Table 3) which implies that the water consumption is spatially heterogeneous during la Saison. As mentioned before, water is abundantly available during this season, and crop growth appears not to be hampered by water shortages (Vandersypen et al 2006(Vandersypen et al , 2009. The values for c v found in the Office du Niger are similar to those measured in the Nile Delta in Egypt, which equalled 0.10 (Bastiaanssen 1997).…”

Assessing the impact of rehabilitation and irrigation management transfer in minor irrigation projects in Orissa, India: A case study

“…An assessment study of IMT in Turkey by Kucu et al (2008), revealed that relative water supply had not shown any important change before and after transfer. Similarly, Vandersypen et al (2009) mentioned in the Office du Niger Irrigation Scheme in Mali that collective action at the intake level of the tertiary blocks improved irrigation efficiency, but was limited to 11 out of 36 tertiary blocks. These call for further improvement in post-IMT to have a better hydrological regime in the command.…”

“…In Turkey, Yercan et al (2004) reported an increase in irrigated areas compared to those in the pretransfer period; another study on assessment of IMT (Kucu et al, 2008) revealed that the irrigation ratio increased by around 4% (from 58 to 62%) after the transfer. Results from a field study carried out in the Office du Niger Irrigation Scheme in Mali (Vandersypen et al, 2009) revealed that collective action at the intake level of the tertiary blocks improved irrigation efficiency by at least 14%, but was limited to 11 out of 36 tertiary blocks. Collective action made water allocation much better (26 out of 36 tertiary blocks), mitigating irrigation problems in the tertiary blocks.…”

“…This will lead to better decision making and empathy, avoiding conflicts and influence of resource-rich farmers. It is reported that some farmer groups in Mali do not succeed in establishing collective action; hence, a mix of incentives and measures are proposed to resolve the conflict between farmers and central management to their mutual benefit (Vandersypen et al, 2009). Awareness and motivational training for farmers to pay water taxes regularly may solve the problem of the periodical fund generation process of WUAs.…”

Contribution of an innovation platform to change the management of collective irrigation: a case study from the Office du Niger (Mali)

“…That was stipulated in the first Contrat Plan in 1994. It was assumed that the Plan expressed everyone's interests, but performance did not significantly improve, because of a lack of incentive measures to bring about the desired collective action on the part of tenants (Vandersypen et al, 2007;Vandersypen et al, 2009).…”