Liveness and Consistency of Bitcoin and Prism Blockchains: The Non-lockstep Synchronous Case

Li, Jing; Guo, Dongning

doi:10.1109/icbc48266.2020.9169464

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Liveness [33]: The liveness of a consensus protocol refers to the fact that if a consensus proposal is correct and sent to the consensus network, it will ultimately be confirmed in the consensus network. Liveness ensures that the consensus protocol will continue to operate without interruption due to node failures or other factors, thereby preventing the entire consensus process from being blocked and causing a decline in system performance.…”

Section: Proof Of Safety and Livenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Linear Consensus Protocol Based on Vague Sets and Multi-Attribute Decision-Making Methods

Yang,

Tsai

2024

Electronics

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This paper proposes a linear consensus protocol QuickBFT based on Vague sets and multi-attribute decision-making methods. QuickBFT simplifies the communication process based on the HotStuff protocol, reduces the four-stage communication to three-stage communication, and reduces the consensus delay. Furthermore, we introduce the Vague set and multi-attribute decision-making theory into the consensus protocol and propose a new leader node selection algorithm, which can prevent Byzantine nodes from becoming leader nodes, thereby improving the protocol performance when the leader node is attacked. Experimental results show that the throughput of QuickBFT is slightly higher than that of the HotStuff protocol without Byzantine nodes, and the consensus delay is reduced by 20%. In the presence of Byzantine nodes, the throughput of QuickBFT is increased by 80% compared with the HotStuff protocol, and the consensus delay is reduced by 60%.

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Section: Proof Of Safety and Livenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Linear Consensus Protocol Based on Vague Sets and Multi-Attribute Decision-Making Methods

Yang,

Tsai

2024

Electronics

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“…Proof Sketch. Our safety analysis of Crystal follows the existing methods of NC [6], [7], [25], [34], [35]. In particular, safety analysis of NC relies on a special kind of block called converged block (aka convergence opportunity [6], [7] or double-lagger [35]).…”

Section: Safety Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, the analysis goal is also to show that during a period, with high probability, there always exist such converged blocks no matter what the attacker does. As the only difference between the safety analysis of NC and Crystal lies in the conditions for converged blocks (i.e., ∆ vs. 2∆), the existing safety proofs of NC [6], [7], [25], [34], [35] can be easily extended to Crystal.…”

Section: Safety Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Crystal: Enhancing Blockchain Mining Transparency With Quorum Certificate

Niu

Gai

Han

et al. 2023

IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.

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Researchers have discovered a series of theoretical attacks against Bitcoin's Nakamoto consensus; the most damaging ones are selfish mining, double-spending, and consistency delay attacks. These attacks have one common cause: block withholding. This paper proposes Crystal, which leverages quorum certificates to resist block withholding misbehavior. Crystal continuously elects committees from miners and requires each block to have a quorum certificate, i.e., a set of signatures issued by members of its committee. Consequently, an attacker has to publish its blocks to obtain quorum certificates, rendering block withholding impossible. To build Crystal, we design a novel two-round committee election in a Sybil-resistant, unpredictable and non-interactive way, and a reward mechanism to incentivize miners to follow the protocol. Our analysis and evaluations show that Crystal can significantly mitigate selfish mining and double-spending attacks. For example, in Bitcoin, an attacker with 30% of the total computation power will succeed in double-spending attacks with a probability of 15.6% to break the 6-confirmation rule; however, in Crystal, the success probability for the same attacker falls to 0.62%. We provide formal end-to-end safety proofs for Crystal, ensuring no unknown attacks will be introduced. To the best of our knowledge, Crystal is the first protocol that prevents selfish mining and double-spending attacks while providing safety proof.

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“…This means they showed that transactions in the Nakamoto consensus eventually become permanent (also called committed, decided, finalized, or immutable in the literature), but do not provide concrete results on when that happens. Several recent works give concrete analysis [6,7,4] but their methods are quite complex. In particular, [6,7] resort to a stochastic analysis of races between renewal processes and focus on confirmation by time rather than the more practically relevant confirmation by depth.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several recent works give concrete analysis [6,7,4] but their methods are quite complex. In particular, [6,7] resort to a stochastic analysis of races between renewal processes and focus on confirmation by time rather than the more practically relevant confirmation by depth. [4] involves an advanced analysis of forkable strings and numerically evaluating a Markov chain, where the results are not in closed form.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%