2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2014.12.003
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Loan loss provisions, accounting constraints, and bank ownership structure

Abstract: This paper examines how the tightening of accounting constraints associated with the SunTrust bank decision in 1998 impacted the loan loss reserve policies of banks differently based on ownership structure. The SunTrust case, the result of an SEC inquiry over possible overstating of loan loss reserves, represented a strengthening of accounting priorities, which stress the importance of the reserve account for financial statement objectivity and comparability, relative to supervisory priorities, which emphasize… Show more

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Cited by 38 publications
(31 citation statements)
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“…Therefore, bank managers' awareness of these expectations would provide incentive for the manager to smooth his income to avoid sending a negative signal to investors and regulators regarding the bank's prospects. The extent of income smoothing by a bank manager would also depend on existing accounting regulations and the accounting number used to achieve income smoothing, among other factors (Leventis et al, 2011;Ahmed et al, 2013;Balla and Rose, 2015). For instance, loan loss provision is well-documented in the literature as a tool used by banks to smooth reported earnings, however, the extent of earnings smoothing is also influenced by disclosure rules.…”
Section: Earnings Smoothingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, bank managers' awareness of these expectations would provide incentive for the manager to smooth his income to avoid sending a negative signal to investors and regulators regarding the bank's prospects. The extent of income smoothing by a bank manager would also depend on existing accounting regulations and the accounting number used to achieve income smoothing, among other factors (Leventis et al, 2011;Ahmed et al, 2013;Balla and Rose, 2015). For instance, loan loss provision is well-documented in the literature as a tool used by banks to smooth reported earnings, however, the extent of earnings smoothing is also influenced by disclosure rules.…”
Section: Earnings Smoothingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They find evidence that US banks use LLPs to smooth earnings when accounting disclosure regulation made it difficult to use derivatives to smooth bank earnings. Other US studies include: Balla and Rose (2015), Dou et al (2016), Morris, Kang, and Jie (2016), etc. To sum up, above studies suggest that the propensity for banks to use LLPs for income smoothing purposes depends on (i) the size of earning or the earnings distribution, (ii) the state of economy particularly during recessions or crisis periods, (iii) strict accounting disclosure rules intended to discourage the manipulation of bank accruals, as well as (iv) regulatory capital requirements.…”
Section: Us Studiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Leventis et al (2011) show that income smoothing via LLP is reduced after IFRS adoption. Balla and Rose (2015) examine whether accounting constraints introduced by the US SEC in 1998 limit LLP-based income smoothing among US banks and find that shortly after the SEC enforced the accounting constraint the relationship between LLPs and earnings weakened for publiclyheld banks but not for privately-held banks, implying reduced income smoothing. Abdul Adzis et al (2016) investigate the impact of IAS 39 among banks in Hong Kong and find that bank income smoothing via LLP is reduced after the adoption and compliance with IAS 39.…”
Section: Constraint To Smooth Incomementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Public entities face more short-term profit pressure than private entities and focus more on periodic performance measures (Narayanan 1985;Stein 1989;Shleifer and Vishny 1990;Bushee 1998;Asker et al 2015). As a result, when bank profits are high, public banks are more incentivized than private banks to overestimate the ALLL to smooth earnings (Balla and Rose 2015). But 13 when facing profit declines, public banks are more incentivized to underprovision (Beatty et al 2002).…”
Section: Predictionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because periodic performance measures, such as earnings and equity capital, are more important to public banks than to private banks, the incentives to misreport the ALLL are intensified among public banks (e.g., Balla and Rose 2015;Beatty et al 2002). Effective bank supervision should restrict banks from 4 misreporting the ALLL, no matter how incentivized the banks are.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%