Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections

Bils, Peter; Duggan, John; Judd, Gleason

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2021.105223

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 41 publications

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“…Some papers also consider multiple competing IGs (e.g. Cotton and Dellis, 2016;Dellis and Oak, 2019;Bils, Duggan and Judd, 2021). See also Perlman (2020Perlman ( , 2023 for analyses of the incentives for firms to disclose information to gain an advantage over their market competitors.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Informational Lobbying and Implementation Standards

Blumenthal

2024

Preprint

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Policymakers are often uncertain about the right course of action. To inform their decisions, policymakers might rely on information provided by interest groups (IGs). Given that their interests are often misaligned, IGs might under-provide information to policymakers. This paper explores the possibility for policymakers of committing to implementation standards prior to IGs’ lobbying, to induce more information transmission. I show that setting implementation standards ex-ante can benefit policymakers, despite possible ex-post inefficiencies, by inducing informational lobbying in cases in which IGs would not have lobbied with implementation standards set ex-post. I discuss implications of these results for constitutional design, legislative politics, and bureaucratic politics.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Informational Lobbying and Implementation Standards

Blumenthal

2024

Preprint

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Access to Proposers and Influence in Collective Policy Making

Judd¹

2023

The Journal of Politics

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Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence

Schnakenberg,

Turner

2024

Annual Review of Political Science

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The impact of money on politics—whether through campaign finance, lobbying, or independent expenditure—raises key normative questions about democratic representation and accountability. In recent years there has been a deluge of new data allowing researchers to study money in politics from new and exciting perspectives. As a complement to this trend, there has also been a resurgence of interest in developing formal models to provide new theoretical insights that can help us understand how, why, and when money influences politics and policy. We review several major themes in this literature, focusing specifically on exchange-based models, informational models, and subsidy-based models. We compare and contrast the key contributions, and limitations, of each approach in understanding the role of lobbying and campaign finance in politics. We also discuss future avenues for research that incorporate aspects of each approach, which, we believe, will introduce new theoretical insights for understanding special interest influence.

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Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections

Cited by 5 publications

References 41 publications

Informational Lobbying and Implementation Standards

Informational Lobbying and Implementation Standards

Access to Proposers and Influence in Collective Policy Making

Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence

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