Lobbying for Education in a Two‐Sector Model

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Lobbying for Education in a Two-sector Model Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn a two-period model, firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the social planner. However, if lobbying is costly, only one sector finds it profitable to offer monetary contribution and direct resources towards the type of education required by its production. Which sector will engage in lobbying depends on relative size, productivity and price in the two sectors.JEL-Code: I200, D720. Debora Di Gioacchino April 2011We thank Maurizio Franzini, Vincenzo Galasso, Francesco Vona and Brunero Liseo for useful comments. We thank Elena Pisano for excellent research assistance.

Vocational schools as an instrument of interregional competition—Empirical evidence from German counties

“…Bradley and Taylor (1996) find support for the existence of these positive feedback effects in their empirical analysis for local England. Di Gioacchino and Profeta (2014) develop a two-sector model on lobbying for education, arguing rather the other way round:…”