Lobbying from Inside the System

Abstract

Why do cities spend scarce resources lobbying the federal government? The hierarchy of U.S. government provides various pathways for local representation. Nevertheless, cities regularly invest in paid representation. This presents a puzzle for American democracy. Why do cities lobby, and do they lobby strategically? We quantify for the first time the extent of this phenomenon and examine its determinants using new data on 498 cities across forty-five states from 1998 to 2008. We find that economic distress pushes cities to lobby, but does not impact expenditures. Cities in competitive congressional districts, and therefore crucial to national politics, spend more on lobbying.

Lobbyierende Kantone

“…Federal-State Relations Offices and Governors Associations in Washington (Jensen, 2016) oder When Cities Lobby: How Local Governments Compete for Power in State Politics (Payson, 2022) pflegen ein sichtlich entspanntes, unaufgeregtes Verhältnis zum Lobbyingbegriff, um das absichtsvolle Mittun der 50 Bundesstaaten sowie von unzähligen Städten in der «federal arena» darzustellen (vgl. Pelissero und England, 1987;Hays, 1991;Flanagan, 1999;Radin und Boase, 2000;Esterling, 2009;Jensen und Kelkres Emery, 2011;Loftis und Kettler, 2015;Jensen, 2016Jensen, , 2017Jensen, , 2018Goldstein und You, 2017;Constantelos, 2018;Payson, 2020a,b;Anzia, 2022;Zhang, 2022). Schlagzeilen wie Local Governments Spend Big to Lobby Legislature (The Seattle Times, 18.6.2013), New York Government Entities Spent $8.4M Lobbying Each Other in 2015 (Politico, 22.9.2016) oder Oklahoma Governor Hires $120K-Per-Year Washington Lobbyist (US News, 30.3.2021) sind an der Tagesordnung.…”

“…Eine derart breit angelegte Untersuchung föderaler Mitwirkung fehlt bislang nämlich selbst für die US-amerikanischen Bundesstaaten, wo es spätestens seit den 1970er Jahren Usus ist, einen «Lobbyingfilter» zu bemühen (vgl. Pelissero und England, 1987;Hays, 1991;Flanagan, 1999;Radin und Boase, 2000;Esterling, 2009;Jensen und Kelkres Emery, 2011;Loftis und Kettler, 2015;Jensen, 2016Jensen, , 2017Jensen, , 2018Goldstein und You, 2017;Constantelos, 2018;Payson, 2020a,b;Anzia, 2022;Zhang, 2022). In allen anderen klassischen Bundesstaaten wird «shared rule» weiterhin fast ausschliesslich unter dem Blickwinkel vertikaler Föderalismusinstitutionen verhandelt (u. a.…”

Listen to us: How Dutch subnational governments together use public affairs to create a favorable position in the national and European political arenas

“…Our findings are in accordance with the observations of Seinstra and Sietsma (2012) and of Kiers (2014) that show how, outside the municipal and provincial offices, decentralized governments and administrations indeed have to strengthen their position by cooperation, that is, in the region and in the national and European political arenas, besides the collective, institutional cooperation they already have because of particular national associations (e.g., VNG (Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten), a collective in which all Dutch municipalities are represented). The good news is that subnational governments seem to understand the power of the political environment in which they operate and increasingly externalize actions to influence that same environment, retaining a lobbyist in an attempt to influence national and European policy (Loftis & Kettler, 2015).…”

Do Tax and Expenditure Limits Influence Federal Lobbying by State and Local Governments? Evidence from A Panel Dataset

“…The current study also follows Goldstein and You (2017) and derives the (log of) state and local lobbying expenditures by year as its dependent variable, due to the skewed 4. Expenditure data is employed as a proxy for lobbying activity and follows Goldstein and You (2017) and Loftis and Kettler (2008). distribution of the data.…”