Lobbying in the European Union: From<i>sui generis</i>to a comparative perspective

Woll, Cornelia

doi:10.1080/13501760600560623

Cited by 96 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…EU interest group research has moved from older theoretical perspectives that were derived from international relations and comparative politics approaches, towards newer modes of analysis that are rooted in policy studies, concepts of associative and deliberative democracy, and studies focusing on multilevel governance and the Europeanization of interest groups. While most of these approaches have been developed in other areas of Comparative Politics and International Relations, especially the literature on multi-level governance and Europeanization studies do now feed back into other areas of political science (see also Woll 2006). There is now a healthy variety of theoretical and analytical lenses on EU interest groups but unfortunately communication among scholars working in different traditions is rather poor.…”

Section: A Fissured Theoretical Landscapementioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups in EU policy-making

Eising¹

2008

Living Rev. Euro. Gov.

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There is a plethora of studies on interest groups in the European Union. While these studies have generated a wealth of insights, it is not actually clear what they have accomplished. This Living Review seeks to identify those areas of interest group studies in which our knowledge is fairly consolidated and in which major research gaps or major controversies can be noted. I argue that these research gaps and controversies stem from both the empirical variance in the interest group landscape and the theoretical segmentation of EU interest group studies. These have been shaped by influences from Comparative Politics, International Relations, Policy Analysis, and Democratic Theory. I suggest that future research should engage to a greater extent in cross-cutting theoretical debates in order to overcome the pronounced demarcation of research areas and in more rigorous theory testing than has sometimes been the case. The article starts by discussing the problem of conceptualizing interest groups before moving on to the fissured theoretical landscape. Thereafter, major research themes are discussed. First, I review the relation between EU institutions and interest groups. Here, I look both into multilevel governance and Europeanization studies that focus on the vertical interaction and into analyses that stress the horizontal segmentation of the EU system in different institutions and sectors. Second, I analyze core themes of EU and comparative interest group studies, namely the issue of collective action, the access of interest groups to policy-makers and their influence on EU policymaking. How to cite this articleOwing to the fact that a Living Reviews article can evolve over time, we recommend to cite the article as follows:Rainer Eising, "Interest groups in EU policy-making", Living Rev.

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Section: A Fissured Theoretical Landscapementioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups in EU policy-making

Eising¹

2008

Living Rev. Euro. Gov.

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“…More recent studies have investigated the strategies used by special interest to participate at the different policy levels, relying increasingly on large N-studies (cf. Woll, 2006;Coen, 2007;De Bie`vre and Du¨r, 2007;Beyers et al, 2008).…”

Section: Eu Lobbying: Expert Knowledge and Multi-level Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison

Woll

2012

Int Groups Adv

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Executive Summary Lobbying on both sides of the Atlantic has experienced a considerable boom in the last 50 years and one could be led to believe that the two industries look increasingly alike. Lobbyists have become highly professionalized and master a multitude of venues and levels of political authority. Direct representation of companies or other stakeholders co-exists with associational representation in both Washington DC and Brussels, even though peak associations play a greater role in Europe. The use of some instruments is different, however, in particular financial contributions and legal tactics, which are central in the United States (US) and much less common in the European Union (EU). What is more, observers of lobbying in the US and the EU have noted the markedly different lobbying styles: frequently aggressive advocacy approach in the US and a more consensus-oriented informational lobbying in the EU. While US groups and lobbyists oftentimes defend their immediate interest by trying to exert pressure on public officials, EU representatives seem to be more soft-spoken in their approach and are said to work in a more constructive manner with bureaucratic and political representatives. After developing a description of what makes up the respective styles, this article discusses cultural and institutional explanations cited in the literature. Rather than seeing lobbying styles as culture traits, it discusses the institutional constraints affecting lobbying behavior. In particular, the passage rate of proposals, the fragmentation of public media, the electoral structure and the transparency of political negotiations create different incentive structures in the US and the EU. However, lobbying styles are more than the cumulative effect of these different elements. They are linked to the nature of the political system, of which the institutional constraints are a reflection. The US, a fully established federal system, relies on majority decision-making. This creates an adversarial culture and 'winner-takes-all-politics'. The EU, by contrast, functions as a complex intergovernmental system with a high degree of supranational centralization. The resulting tension between integration and inter-state bargaining creates a system that relies on consensus-building. In this context, the access of private actors to supranational institutions depends on their contribution to the creation of problem-solving policy approaches. As long as the EU has to rely on the acceptance of its policy outputs for its legitimacy, we are bound to find many individual r

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“…For Germany, studies by Kinderman (2005Kinderman ( , 2014, Menz (2005), and Speth (2004) document a similar intensification of efforts by business associations to delegitimize social programs and "big government" through a "war of ideas," even though, unlike Swedish employers, German employers' associations did not attack corporatist bargaining. Woll observes similar developments in France: the national employer federation there shifted away from corporatist compromises and turned toward a more aggressive strategy of public campaigning and lobbying (Woll 2006b). Austria appears to be an exception to this trend, as no comparable turn against corporatism and welfare programs can be observed there (Paster 2014).…”

Section: Adaptation and Preference Change: Reconciliation Or Radicalimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most of the literature, however, focuses on the national level and thus I decided to limit my review to that. While we know that transnational business groups and transnational corporations exercise considerable influence on politics at the European and the global level (Dür/Bernhagen/Marshall 2015;Sklair 2001Sklair : 2-3, 2012Sklair , 2002Farnsworth 2005aFarnsworth , 2005bRasmussen 2014;Woll 2006a), research about their involvement in social policy-making is still rather limited. I elaborate on my definition of social policy at the beginning of Section 3.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bringing Power Back in: A Review of the Literature on the Role of Business in Welfare State Politics

Paster

2015

SSRN Journal

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What is the impact of business interest groups on the formulation of public social policies? This paper reviews the literature in political science, history, and sociology on this question. It identifies two strands: one analyzes the political power and influence of business, the other the preferences and interests of business. Since the 1990s, researchers have shifted their attention from questions of power to questions of preferences.

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Lobbying in the European Union: Fromsui generisto a comparative perspective

Cited by 96 publications

References 52 publications

Interest groups in EU policy-making

Interest groups in EU policy-making

The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison

Bringing Power Back in: A Review of the Literature on the Role of Business in Welfare State Politics

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