Lobbying Mechanisms

Gregor, Martin

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44582-3_2

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2021

2023

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Cited by 9 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The large difference between the prize being lobbied over and lobbying expenditures has been noted by others (Kang 2016; Gregor 2017) and this article can help explain some of that variation. First, the endogenous prize effect clearly dominates the rent‐seeking effect; this means there is less incentive for certain firms to participate and instead simply free‐ride.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 67%

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Lobbying for government appropriations

Cox

2023

The RAND J of Economics

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This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then I structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small. Lastly, I find that increasing competition in procurement generally results in less lobbying.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 67%

“…1 The second stage of the model here is an extension of Hirai and Szidarovszky (2013). Lobbying models typically follow Grossman and Helpman (1994) or Tullock (1967) (Gregor 2017). For empirical articles based on the former framework, see Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga (2012) and Huneeus and Kim (2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%