Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System

Stephenson, Matthew C.; Jackson, Howell E.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1331503

Cited by 8 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…They are merely servants who advise clients and execute their orders (Kersh, 2000). But agency problems may easily arise in lobbying due to adverse selection such that the lobbyist agent may poorly seek influence on behalf of clients (Stephenson and Jackson, 2009).…”

Section: The Unprincipled Agent Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying influence: Meaning, measurement and missing

2013

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Executive Summary All too often, research on the influence of interest organizations in democratic politics produces null findings. What are we to make of these results? In part, the answer may lie in our conception of influence -what it is and what might constitute evidence for it. But even when more complete conceptions of influence are considered in better research designs, null results will still occur. They merit explanation. To address these issues, I will first try to provide a broader conception of influence and its many possible meanings by exploring the older theoretical literature on urban power from the 1950s and 1960s, considering along the way what the different interpretations might tell us about lobbying. And second, I will develop a catalog of null hypotheses and discuss how these bear on interpreting the many null findings in influence research. Finally, I discuss the implications of this analysis for the future of influence research.

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Section: The Unprincipled Agent Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying influence: Meaning, measurement and missing

2013

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“…Further, the literature on agency issues in public bureaucracy is sometimes quite pessimistic (Miller, 1992; see also Gates, 1997, 2008) and offers an extensive catalogue of reasons why the monitoring and incentive systems of hierarchies are unlikely to control shirking. Indeed, similar to the earlier cited ambiguity of outcomes in external contracting noted by Stephenson and Jackson (2009), Brehm and Gates (1994, p. 325) go so far as to suggest that, 'In practice, the supervisor may not be able to distinguish compliance from defection'. Nor are the market pressures operating at the level of the firm noted by Farma (1980) likely to be effective given that they are plausibly more telling of the organization's core activities rather than its peripheral functions.…”

Section: Hierarchical Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 66%

“…Before doing so, however, we must note that there are two different kinds of lobbyists working for firms and other institutions (organizations without members): the contract lobbyists that are the focus of Stephenson and Jackson's (2009) analysis and in-house lobbyists or public affairs officers. Either or both types of lobbyists might also work for organizations with members; as representatives of associations (which have firms as members, such as trade associations) or representatives of membership organizations (which have individuals as members).…”

Section: Agency Problems In Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The problem of adverse selection concerns misalignments between the interests of principals and those of their agents, an issue on which Stephenson and Jackson's (2009) analysis is especially useful. There are two broad types of such conflicts.…”

Section: Problems Of Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Stephenson and Jackson (2009) note with respect to lobbyists, 'The fundamental opportunity that creates the opportunity for agency slack is asymmetric information. The lobbyist usually knows more about how the legislative process works, what options are feasible, what strategies are likely to be successful or unsuccessful, the potential ramifications of certain government actions, and so forth'.…”

Section: Problems Of Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

You don’t know Jack: Principals, agents and lobbying

Lowery

Marchetti

2012

Int Groups Adv

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Executive Summary Most recent work on the politics of interest representation assumes that lobbyists represent their clients' interests with fidelity. As a check on the validity of this assumption, we examine the potential for principal-agent problems to emerge in the relationship between lobbyists and clients. We first consider the nature of agency problems in lobbying, emphasizing problems of outcomes, interests and monitoring. Next, we examine market, hierarchical and social controls of agency problems in lobbying. We then discuss the implications of our analysis for studies of interest organization mobilization, tactics and strategies, and influence. And finally, we argue that renewed attention must be paid to the internal operation of interest organizations, a subject that has been given scant attention in recent research on interest representation.In 2006, lobbyist Jack Abramoff was convicted -along with two White House officials, US Representative Robert Ney, and nine other lobbyists and Congressional aides -of a range of crimes, including mail fraud and conspiracy. The Washington Post summarized one of the core elements of the case against Abramoff as follows:Washington lobbyist Jack Abramoff and public relations consultant Michael Scanlon quietly worked with conservative religious activist Ralph Reed to help the state of Texas shut down an Indian tribe's casino in 2002, then the two quickly persuaded the tribe to pay $4.2 million to try to get Congress to reopen it. Dozens of e-mails written by the three men and obtained by The Washington Post show how they built public r

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The moving stages of public affairs in the Netherlands

Timmermans

2015

Int Groups Adv

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The Dutch system of interest representation in which lobbying and public affairs take place is dense, but has long given privileged access to traditional types of stakeholders. Changes in politics and society however put this semi-open system under pressure, and this is the context in which public affairs practitioners must operate and create and use windows of opportunity. In the past 15 years, views from within the field on competencies and skills for further professionalization point to the importance of knowledge about content and process, but recognition of the need for a systematic approach to such knowledge construction came more recently. This contribution presents three key components of a body of knowledge on which a learning program for the professionalization of public affairs can be based. It contains the outward look from a strategic perspective, the conditions for building and maintaining social and political capital, and an internal view on the organization as the home basis of the public affairs practitioner, where external and internal accountability must be brought in balance. A university-based program on public affairs must be interdisciplinary, with a core of systematic knowledge development, methods and tools for use and reflection on the normative front at which practitioners operate. Program development also connects closely to questions of accreditation and licensing -the formalization of professionalization through which quality control and public acceptance must be improved. Program development and formal status definition for public affairs not only are connected, they also must, in the coming years, be addressed together in a structured scholarly-professional engagement. Lobbyists: The Image Between Ideal Type and StereotypeLike the ideal husband, the good cop and the celebrated politician, there is the ideal lobbyist. A splendid package of personal characteristics can make someone a good

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Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System

Cited by 8 publications

References 6 publications

Lobbying influence: Meaning, measurement and missing

Lobbying influence: Meaning, measurement and missing

You don’t know Jack: Principals, agents and lobbying

The moving stages of public affairs in the Netherlands

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