Local developmental state and order in China's urban development during transition

Abstract

Rules and order in urban construction, and thus the relationship between the market and the state, are a fundamental issue for urban development. In China, a transition economy, marketization has been actively promoted under the economic reforms to replace central‐planning and has contributed significantly to the subsequent dynamic urban growth. However, the role of the state in defining an institutional framework for the market is lagging behind. Fiscal deficiency in conjunction with a pro‐growth position undermines the capacity of the local developmental state to exercise effective developmental controls. Without effective state enforcement of rules, market order does not emerge when uncertainty pervades the marketplace. The phenomenon of urban villages and the case of Luohu's redevelopment clearly show that the absence of the state both in constructing the market and as a third‐party gives rise to the logic of the commons or quasi‐commons in the land development market. Inferior and suboptimal developments ensue. En construction urbaine, les règles et la discipline, donc le rapport entre marché et État, constituent un aspect fondamental de l'aménagement des villes. Dans l'économie de transition chinoise, la commercialisation – activement stimulée par des réformes économiques visant à remplacer la planification centrale – a énormément contribuéà la dynamique de la croissance urbaine. Toutefois, le rôle de l'État dans la définition du cadre institutionnel du marché ne suit pas le rythme. Carences fiscales associées à une position favorable à la croissance empêchent l'État local moteur de développement de contrôler efficacement la croissance. Sans une application étatique effective des règles, il ne naït pas de discipline de marché, l'incertitude régnant. Le phénomène des villages urbains et le cas du réaménagement de Luohu montrent clairement que l'absence de l'État, tant dans l'élaboration du marché qu'en tant que tiers, introduit la logique des terrains communaux ou quasi‐communaux sur le marché de l'aménagement foncier. Il en résulte des équipements de second ordre, inférieurs à la qualité optimale.

Emerging Chinese Cities: Implications for Global Urban Studies

“…Recent studies highlight the role of land development in Chinese urbanization and the sale of land to generate revenue. Land finance dominates the overall process and creates local entrepreneurialism (Zhu 2004;Chien 2013;L. Wang 2014).…”

“…In urban areas, a significant proportion was under individual workplaces or "socialist land masters" (Hsing 2006(Hsing , 2010. In rural areas, though, collective ownership meant that the power of dealing with land development was ambiguous (Zhu 2004). Urban villages can be regarded as Chinese informal settlements (Y. P. Wang, Wang, and Wu 2009).…”

Spatial–Temporal Patterns and Driving Factors of Rapid Urban Land Development in Provincial China: A Case Study of Jiangsu

“…The property sector has become the engine of economic growth and revenue capturing. Various "growth coalitions" were formed by local chief officials and land developers [33]. Moreover, local governments fiercely compete for resources and investments by setting up preferential policies of taxation and land prices, which further complicate urban land development [34].…”

Urban ecological conservation policy in Shenzhen: the production of a ‘Biophysical Fix’

“…A triple process of globalisation, decentralisation and marketisation has made the Shenzhen local government autonomous in its decision-making (Zhu, 2004). The power centre of the city of Shenzhen remains mainly within the local government, which is in its early stages of development, in common with other cities in China.…”