Local Majority-with-inertia Rule Can Explain Global Consensus Dynamics in A Network Coordination Game

Gaisbauer, Felix; Strandburg‐Peshkin, Ariana; Giese, Helge

doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2022.01.013

Cited by 6 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…The final outcome was dominated by the subpopulation that had a higher net preference (product of stubbornness and fraction of individuals with the preference). This finding is consistent with previous literature on how stubborn minorities and zealots can dominate decision-making and lead to undemocratic outcomes [ 1 , 19 , 60 ]. We emphasize that while highly stubborn individuals can shape outcomes towards their preferences, they risk preventing global consensus from being reached [ 19 , 32 ].…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

“…Decision-making in social groups of humans and non-human animals [1][2][3][4] often requires individuals to collectively reach consensus from a set of choices. Animal collectives such as schooling fish or flocking birds must constantly engage in consensus decision-making to maintain group cohesion while moving together [5][6][7][8][9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result, link structures shape how opinions spread in a network and can facilitate or impede consensus outcomes [ 16 , 40 , 41 ]. Importantly, communication networks are not always static, and social influence can be determined by individuals' choices of who they communicate with [ 1 , 42 ]. Thus, the strategic selection and updating of links may have a crucial impact on group-level outcomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Link updating strategies influence consensus decisions as a function of the direction of communication

et al. 2023

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Consensus decision-making in social groups strongly depends on communication links that determine to whom individuals send, and from whom they receive, information. Here, we ask how consensus decisions are affected by strategic updating of links and how this effect varies with the direction of communication. We quantified the coevolution of link and opinion dynamics in a large population with binary opinions using mean-field numerical simulations of two voter-like models of opinion dynamics: an incoming model (IM) (where individuals choose who to receive opinions from) and an outgoing model (OM) (where individuals choose who to send opinions to). We show that individuals can bias group-level outcomes in their favour by breaking disagreeing links while receiving opinions (IM) and retaining disagreeing links while sending opinions (OM). Importantly, these biases can help the population avoid stalemates and achieve consensus. However, the role of disagreement avoidance is diluted in the presence of strong preferences—highly stubborn individuals can shape decisions to favour their preferences, giving rise to non-consensus outcomes. We conclude that collectively changing communication structures can bias consensus decisions, as a function of the strength of preferences and the direction of communication.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Link updating strategies influence consensus decisions as a function of the direction of communication

et al. 2023

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“…Research has approached these systems as inherently dynamic, allowing for repeated interactions. However, information from neighboring nodes tends not to be revealed until all agents have made their decision (Gaisbauer et al, 2022). Future research could address questions such as how the speed of a decision interacts with a network structure, which structures promote (or prevent) the influence of early-deciding individuals, and how individuals adapt their network to facilitate temporal coordination (Gross & Blasius, 2008).…”

Section: Individual Heterogeneity and Social Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

A cognitive computational approach to social and collective decision-making

Tump¹,

Deffner²,

Pleskac³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Collective dynamics play a key role in everyday decision-making. Whether social influence promotes the spread of accurate information and ultimately results in adaptive behavior or leads to false information cascades and maladaptive social contagion strongly depends on the cognitive mechanisms underlying social interactions. Here we argue that cognitive modeling, in tandem with experiments that allow collective dynamics to emerge, can mechanistically link cognitive processes at the individual and collective levels. We illustrate the strength of this cognitive computational approach with two highly successful cognitive models that have been applied to interactive group experiments: evidence accumulation and reinforcement learning models. We show how these approaches make it possible to simultaneously study (i) how individual cognition drives social systems, (ii) how social systems drive individual cognition, and (iii) the dynamic feedback processes between the two layers.

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“…This leads us to shift our focus to the evolution of cooperation in more complex coordination games. [52,53] A typical example of a coordination game is the stag hunt game, in which hunting stag has Pareto dominance over hunting hare for two players. However, the game has two Nash equilibrium points, both of which can be seen as group norms, making it impossible to predict the outcome using Nash equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of conformity on evolution of cooperation in a coordination game

Wang

2023

Chinese Phys. B

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Individual decision-making processes are not solely driven by self-interest maximization but are also influenced by the pressure to conform to the group. In primary games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the presence of conformity pressure may facilitate the constructive development of cooperative behavior. In this study, we investigate how conformity influences the growth of cooperation in complicated coordination games. Our findings reveal that, even in the presence of stringent game rules, conformity can promote cooperation. In fact, a certain level of conformity pressure can even eliminate the ”defection basin” of deer hunting games played on regular networks. Additionally, we demonstrate that the effect of conformity on cooperative behavior is contingent upon the degree of conformity pressure, with different levels of conformity pressure producing opposite effects. These findings provide novel insights into the promotion of cooperative evolution. For instance, if increasing the reward for cooperation has proven ineffective, manipulating the proportion of initial strategy choices may be a more promising approach.

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Local Majority-with-inertia Rule Can Explain Global Consensus Dynamics in A Network Coordination Game

Cited by 6 publications

References 45 publications

Link updating strategies influence consensus decisions as a function of the direction of communication

Link updating strategies influence consensus decisions as a function of the direction of communication

A cognitive computational approach to social and collective decision-making

Effect of conformity on evolution of cooperation in a coordination game

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