Local Underdetermination in Historical Science

Turner, Derek

doi:10.1086/426851

Cited by 66 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…This sort of debate can be witnessed in the exchange between Carol Cleland (2002) and Derek Turner (2005) over the competing merits of historical and experimental science; Cleland argues that they are epistemically on a par, whereas Turner argues that historical science is epistemically inferior in at least some respects. Regardless of how this first-order matter turns out, that it needs exploration at all is an argument favoring localism.…”

Section: Disunitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Going local: a defense of methodological localism about scientific realism

Asay

2016

Synthese

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Scientific realism and anti-realism are most frequently discussed as global theses:theses that apply equally well across the board to all the various sciences. Against this status quo I defend the localist alternative, a methodological stance on scientific realism that approaches debates on realism at the level of individual sciences, rather than at science itself. After identifying the localist view, I provide a number of arguments in its defense, drawing on the diversity and disunity found in the sciences, as well as problems with other approaches (such as basing realism debates on the aim of science). I also show how the view is already at work, explicitly or implicitly, in the work of several philosophers of science. After meeting the objections that localism collapses either into globalism or hyperlocalism, I conclude by sketching what sorts of impacts localism can have in the philosophy of science.

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Section: Disunitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Going local: a defense of methodological localism about scientific realism

Asay

2016

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“…Turner (2005Turner ( , 2007 has argued that in cases where two rival hypotheses H and H* are empirically equivalent,scientists should suspend judgment. However, what we typically see in actual scientific practice (as in this case) is that scientists-even those not originally involved with the analysis of the fossils, like Aiello (2010)-tend to pick sides.…”

Section: What Does Disagreement In the Homo Floresiensis Case Accomplmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They are subject to the historical contingencies of what has been preserved and what has been destroyed over time. This led Turner (2005Turner ( , 2007 to conclude that the historical sciences are epistemically inferior to the experimental sciences, where one can generate evidence in controlled experimental conditions. But crucially, historical events leave many traces, most of which remain unexamined.…”

Section: The Generation Of New Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo floresiensis

Cruz

Smedt

2013

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

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Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement-can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if so, how? We investigate this through a recent case in paleoanthropology: the debate on the taxonomic status of Homo floresiensis remains unresolved, with some authors arguing the fossils represent a novel hominin species, and others claiming that they are Homo sapiens with congenital growth disorders. Our examination of this case in the recent history of science provides insights into the value of peer disagreement, indicating that it is especially valuable if one does not straightaway defer to a peer's conclusions, but nevertheless remains open to a peer's evidence and arguments.

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“…Sometimes nonhistorical properties will serve as a better guide than historical properties even when our knowledge of nonhistorical properties is incomplete. For our knowledge of historical properties can be incomplete as well (Turner 2005). In these cases, experimental measurements, trial and error in conditioning, and studying nonhistorical properties may be useful if not required (Amundson and Lauder 1994, pp.…”

Section: Elder's Version Of the Indispensability Argument: Another Brmentioning

confidence: 99%

Confusion and dependence in uses of history

Slutsky

2010

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Many people argue that history makes a special difference to the subjects of biology and psychology, and that history does not make this special difference to other parts of the world. This paper will show that historical properties make no more or less of a difference to biology or psychology than to chemistry, physics, or other sciences. Although historical properties indeed make a certain kind of difference to biology and psychology, this paper will show that historical properties make the same kind of difference to geology, sociology, astronomy, and other sciences. Similarly, many people argue that nonhistorical properties make a special difference to the nonbiological and the nonpsychological world. This paper will show that nonhistorical properties make the same difference to all things in the world when it comes to their causal behavior and that historical properties make the same difference to all things in the world when it comes to their distributions. Although history is special, it is special in the same way to all parts of the world.

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Local Underdetermination in Historical Science

Cited by 66 publications

References 17 publications

Going local: a defense of methodological localism about scientific realism

Going local: a defense of methodological localism about scientific realism

The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo floresiensis

Confusion and dependence in uses of history

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