Localization of the counterinsurgency in Sinai: A case study on integrating local population into counterinsurgency combat operations in Sinai

Abstract

Integrating local militias in the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Sinai has achieved tangible successes. The presence of local fighters contributed to the penetration of the Islamic State—Sinai Province network. The integration of locals into the ongoing COIN process has imposed a degree of local participation in local governance and decision‐making. Nevertheless, this article argues that there are two approaches to local integration into the COIN operation; the first is institutional integration, in which the state integrates local fighters at an institutional level in the ranks of the security apparatus. The second is the collaborating militia approach. In this pattern, the state resorts to warlords and tribal chiefs to mobilize irregular militias, coordinating with the regular forces in the COIN process without formally merging them into security institutions’ ranks. The Egyptian model in the Sinai is one of the latter type. The collaborating militia integration approach into COIN operations contributes to wooing elites to create narrow patronage networks of cronies, preventing systematized community participation in the decision‐making process, which leads to keeping the factors of rebellion alive below the surface even if the rebels are defeated militarily.