Locating foreign aid commitments in response to political violence

Bezerra, Paul; Braithwaite, Alex

doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0377-9

Cited by 18 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…The severity of the conflict, as gauged by the number of battle-related deaths, does not appear to affect aid allocation in broad terms (Kang & Meernik 2004). Areas with modest levels of conflict may actually attract aid, whereas those with the severe conflict discourage aid (Bezerra & Braithwaite 2016, Lis 2014. The pattern reflects a paradox: Donors increasingly call for aid to be allocated to fragile and conflict-affected areas (Wild et al 2017), but less aid may go to the areas with higher violence due to security concerns (Fast 2014).…”

Section: The Challenge Of Aid Allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Foreign Aid Build Peace?

Findley

2018

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

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Does foreign aid build peace? The answer is of paramount importance for policy makers and practitioners, given that the world's poor are growing increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected countries. Scholars have also demonstrated keen interest, primarily examining the relationship between foreign aid and civil wars. This review takes stock of the existing literature through a survey of key theoretical arguments connecting aid to the onset, dynamics, and recurrence of civil wars. It then articulates a key challenge posed by undertheorization of aid allocation, which is largely nonrandom, making the causal effects difficult to infer. I identify five areas in need of greater attention: microfoundational theoretical assumptions about aid flows; aid in the context of other foreign policy options; explicit articulation of other factors that may mediate or moderate aid's effects; levels of observation and aggregation; and measurement.

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Section: The Challenge Of Aid Allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Foreign Aid Build Peace?

Findley

2018

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

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“…However, conflict also affects aid. The circularity of this is still uncharted territory, but in a recent study looking at development aid commitments in sub‐Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2007, Bezerra and Braithwaite (2016) find that donors react to local needs in violent periods, and also that financing continues after violence ends. However, when the violence becomes severe, donors appear put off and new commitments halt.…”

Section: Aid Allocation: Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Relatedly, Hoelscher et al (2017) find that the presence of conflict increases the likelihood of attacks on aid workers. Addressing existing disparities, Bezerra and Braithwaite (2016) conclude that "violence both attracts and deters new foreign aid. "…”

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confidence: 99%

Disaggregated determinants of aid: Development aid projects in the Philippines

Rosvold

2020

Development Policy Review

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Motivation: Across the world, rapid-onset disasters caused by natural hazards such as storms and floods return with seemingly greater force every year. Many disaster hot spots are particularly vulnerable because of already fragile humanitarian and political situations, some having been affected by armed conflict for decades. These phenomena augment the need for longterm aid, but do they influence the distribution of aid projects? Purpose: This article revisits the long-standing debate over whether donor interests or recipient needs best predict the distribution of development aid. It disaggregates the analysis down to province level in the Philippines, and includes local hazards when assessing an area's need for aid. Approach and methods: Making use of geocoded data on aid projects, rapid-onset disasters caused by natural hazards and armed conflict in Philippine provinces between 1996 and 2012, this article provides an exhaustive assessment of the within-country determinants of World Bank development aid projects. Findings: The article finds that need to some extent influences the distribution of aid projects across Philippine provinces but that, in general, domestic political alliances bias projects in favour of the politically dominant group. Previous exposure to conflict is associated with increased likelihood of new projects, but only in dominant group-majority provinces. While previous disaster exposure is a weak predictor of aid in all provinces, low Human Development Index (HDI) levels significantly predict aid inflow in excluded group-majority provinces. Policy implications: In sum, the article challenges the idea that (international) donors' priorities override the interests of the recipient/local governmesnt in the distribution of aid projects. It also shows that even if the donor's explicit policy is disaster mitigation and relief, there is still some way to go before these considerations are effectively incorporated into development aid efforts.

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“…Only recently has scholarship turned to examining subnational aid allocation patterns. These studies have concentrated on whether aid goes to poorer and more vulnerable places (Barrett, 2015;Briggs, 2017Briggs, , 2018, regions with unique political preferences (Albertus, 2015; Briggs, 2014), political violence (Bezerra & Brainthwaite, 2016), and/or needs (Öhler & Nunnenkamp, 2014). Notably Briggs (2017Briggs ( , 2018 finds no evidence that the World Bank and the African Development Bank target their aid to the poorest regions of recipient countries.…”

Section: Constituency Agency and Subnational Aid Allocation: Theoretimentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Wheel Gets the Grease? Constituent Agency and Sub-national World Bank Aid Allocation

Song

Brazys

Vadlamannati

2020

The Journal of Development Studies

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Questions of aid allocation have long focused on discerning the motivation of development donors. Less attention has been paid to the interests and agency of recipient state governments and even less to the interests and agency of constituencies within those states. An implicit assumption is often that the 'poor' either passively receive the patronage of their benefactors or they don't. In this paper, we instead suggest that depending on the motivation of a donor, their sensitivity to needy subnational constituencies in aid allocation also depends on the political empowerment of those groups. In particular, we take advantage of the unique socio-cultural structure in India to examine if the political agency of scheduled castes and tribes (SC/STs) can explain patterns of district-level allocation of World Bank education aid. Using district-level data on a multiyear World Bank education program, district-level proportions of SC/ST population and of members of parliament we identify poor, but empowered, constituencies. We find that SC/ST districts receive more aid, even when controlling for baseline poverty and educational performance, but that these results are strongest when these districts are politically empowered. Our findings suggest that while donors may indeed respond to recipient needs, those recipients who also speak loudly for themselves fare better, highlighting the importance of constituent agency.

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Locating foreign aid commitments in response to political violence

Cited by 18 publications

References 64 publications

Does Foreign Aid Build Peace?

Does Foreign Aid Build Peace?

Disaggregated determinants of aid: Development aid projects in the Philippines

Which Wheel Gets the Grease? Constituent Agency and Sub-national World Bank Aid Allocation

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