Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates

Brown, Derek H.

doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9509-0

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The phenomenal colours that might be inverted between you and me are the very ones that each of us experiences (i.e. pretheoretically describes) as being on the surfaces of things outside ourselves (Brown 2010). Consider the colours you now experience on this broccoli and this radish.…”

Section: Spectrum Inversionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Projectivism and Phenomenal Presence

Brown¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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Projectivism asserts that we project subjective aspects of perception into what we experience as the world outside ourselves. It is minimally familiar from various phantom pains, afterimages, and hallucinations. Views like sense-datum theory arguably assert a more global, Strong Projectivism: all perceptual experiences involve and only involve direct awareness of projected elements. Strong Projectivism is an underappreciated variety of intentionalism. It straightforwardly explains the transparency of experience, and phenomena qualia theorists offer to avoid intentionalism, including blurry vision and spectrum inversion. Finally, projectivism illuminates residual qualia-friendly cases involving imagination and emotion. Although some cases may provide instances of non-projected, non-intentional aspects of experience, most do not. Thus, the notion of phenomenal presence drawn from projectivism does justice to a great many of the forces at play in debates surrounding qualia and intentionalism. We should bound toward Strong Projectivism.

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Section: Spectrum Inversionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The core idea of this chapter is inspired byBrown (2010), though the present work has a much broader scope.…”

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confidence: 99%

Projectivism and Phenomenal Presence

Brown¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…However, the sense datum theory of color experience has recently been defended byBrown (2010) andRobinson (1994, 59-74), among others.…”

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confidence: 99%

How does colour experience represent the world?

Pautz¹

2020

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour

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There is no call to treat illusory sensible qualities, and in particular colours, as actual qualities of actual entities. David Armstrong (1984) Many favor representationalism about color experience. To a first approximation, this view holds that experiencing is like believing. In particular, like believing, experiencing is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Once you view color experience along these lines, you face a big question: do our color experiences represent the world as it really is? For instance, suppose you see a tomato. Representationalists claim that having an experience with this sensory character is necessarily connected with representing a distinctive quality as pervading a round area out there in external space. Let us call it "sensible redness" to highlight the fact that the representation of this property is necessarily connected with the sensory character of the experience. Is this property, sensible redness, really co-instantiated with roundness out there in the space before you? 1 Since the development of the new mathematical physics of 17 th century, many prominent thinkers have returned a negative answer. Galileo, for instance, famously said that "tastes, odors, colors, and so on reside in consciousness", not the external world. Following this tradition, some contemporary representationalists hold that tomatoes and other objects are just collections of particles and fields lacking sensible properties. We evolved to have experiences that habitually misrepresent objects in space as having various sensible colors, only because this helps us to discriminate them from one another. However, other representationalists resist this radical irrealist view. They think representationalism about color experience goes best with "realism" about sensible colors. The tomato's surface really does exemplify sensible redness. In general, our color experiences typically represent objects as they really are. We will look at these different versions of representationalism. But first I will explain in more detail the basic representationalist approach they share.

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A Study in Deflated Acquaintance Knowledge: Sense-Datum Theory and Perceptual Constancy

Brown

2016

Early Analytic Philosophy - New Perspectives on the Tradition

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Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates

Cited by 5 publications

References 18 publications

Projectivism and Phenomenal Presence

Projectivism and Phenomenal Presence

How does colour experience represent the world?

A Study in Deflated Acquaintance Knowledge: Sense-Datum Theory and Perceptual Constancy

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