Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious Differences

Abstract

Hume's theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke's account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke's distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume's account of self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to answer questions of moral accountability, and Hume's discussion of self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. In response to the puzzle, I show that Locke and Hume hold different moral and religious views and these differences are important to explain why their theories of personal identity differ. 1. Introduction According to Hume, "personal identity. .. has become so great a question in philosophy, especially of late years in England" (T 1.4.6.15; SBN 259). 1 It is clear that Hume's theory is developed in response to Locke's account of personal identity. Hume follows Locke in discussing, first, the identity of plants and animals before turning to personal identity (see Locke, Essay, 2.27; Hume, T 1.4.6.5-20 (SBN 253-62). 2 According to Locke, personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness, and neither sameness of man 3 nor substance are necessary or sufficient for personal identity. Hume in part agrees with Locke in so far that he accepts that memory helps us to form beliefs in personal identity, but he also criticizes Locke when he claims that "we can. .. extend our identity beyond memory" (T 1.4.6.20; SBN 262) by causation. 4 However, it is striking that Hume does not put much emphasis on Locke's distinction between the terms "person," "man," and "substance," let alone acknowledges Locke's claim that "person" is a forensic term (see Locke, Essay 2.27.26).

Character Development in Shaftesbury’s and Hume’s Approaches to Self

“…33 For further discussion, see McIntyre (1989McIntyre ( , 553-556, 2009. 34 See Boeker (2015) for further discussion as to why it is likely that contiguity plays a role in Hume's Book 2 account of selves.…”

David Hume sobre a Dimensão Corporal do Eu

“…A questão da relação entre o eu e o corpo, no entanto, mereceu menos atenção dos intérpretes. Noto três exceções: Annette Baier (1991), Lilli Alanen (2014) e Ruth Boeker (2015). As três autoras, com efeito, observam que a dimensão corporal do eu ganha destaque assim que Hume adentra o exame do aspecto afetivo da natureza humana no Livro II.…”