Locke on Knowledge of Existence

Rockwood, Nathan

doi:10.5206/ls.2016.660

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…In my view, Descartes also thinks 3. For an externalist interpretation of Descartes, see Della Rocca (2005) and Loeb (2010); for Locke, see Bolton (2004), Wilson (2014), and Rockwood (2016; for Hume, see Kemp Smith (1905), Wolterstorff (1996), Loeb (2002) and (2010), Beebee (2006), andSchmitt (2014).…”

Section: Descartes On Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Locke also appeals to the external cause of sensations to explain why the belief in external objects is justified (Wilson 2014;Rockwood 2016;. Locke argues that I can know "the Existence of any other Being, but only when by actual operating upon him, it makes it self perceived by him" (Essay 4.11.1: 630, emphasis added).…”

Section: Locke On Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, Locke argues that the sensation of simple ideas counts as "real ideas" that give us "real knowledge" because those ideas have an external cause and so conform to reality (Essay 2.30.2: 372 and 4.4.3: 563). So, if sensitive knowledge counts as a kind of "real knowledge" (see Newman 2007 andRockwood 2016), then sensitive knowledge would require, in addition to the perception of an agreement between two ideas, this kind of causal connection (Rockwood 2016).…”

Section: Locke On Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Rockwood

2024

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Do Descartes, Locke, and Hume have an internalist or externalist view of epistemic justification? Internalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by a mental state, such as the awareness of evidence. By contrast, externalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by facts about the belief-forming process, such as the reliability of the belief-forming process. I argue that they all think that the awareness of evidence is required for justification, but none of them think that the awareness of evidence alone is sufficient for justification. Similarly, I argue that they all think that reliability of the belief-forming process is required for justification, but none of them think reliability alone is sufficient for justification. So, neither a fully internalist position nor a fully externalist position adequately captures their views of justification; rather, both the supporting evidence and the reliability of the belief-forming process explain why we should hold those beliefs, and hence explain why those beliefs are justified. Thus, they each have a partly internalist, partly externalist view of justification. 

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Section: Descartes On Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Locke On Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Locke On Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Rockwood

2024

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…Miracles, as outward and visible signs, are distinct from the private religious experiences claimed by enthusiasts. They are, as Rockwood neatly puts it, “publicly available evidence supporting revelation” (Rockwood, 2021, n.d.). Only such evidence, Locke argued, could properly confirm the divine authority of some alleged revelation.…”

Section: Problems With the Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Locke on the objective nature of miracles

Barrientos

2023

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues.

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Locke on Empirical Knowledge

Rockwood¹

2018

History of Philosophy Quarterly

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Locke on Knowledge of Existence

Cited by 3 publications

References 4 publications

Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Locke on the objective nature of miracles

Locke on Empirical Knowledge

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