Locke’s Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities

Jackson, Reginald

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15284-1_4

Cited by 9 publications

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“…Boyle does little to answer these questions which have spawned a rich debate in the literature. For example, Reginald Jackson (and Edwin Curley 1972) has argued that Boylean secondary qualities arelike Locke's viewpowers of the mechanical affections of bodies to cause ideas in us of certain kinds (Jackson 1929). Laura Keating used to hold that secondary qualities are "the perceived effects of bodies acting on our sense organs" (Keating 1993, 311).…”

Section: Qualitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Boyle’s Mechanical Philosophy

Jones¹

2020

Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences

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Boyle was the seventh son and fourteenth (out of fifteen) child of Richard Boyle, first Earl of Cork. His mother, Catherine (née Fenton), Countess of Cork, was Richard Boyle's second wife. Robert was educated at Eaton from 1635 to 1638. After Eaton his education was completed by a "grand tour" of Europe (1639-1644) under the tutelage of Isaac Marcombe. In the late 1640s he wrote a series of works on virtue ethics. From 1647 until the mid-1650s, Boyle maintained regular contact with experimental philosophers and social reformers in the group known as the Hartlib Circle. Samuel Hartlib was one of the figures who paved the way for the formation of the Royal Society. Boyle's association with the Hartlib Circle (which includedamong others-William Petty and George Starkey) largely contributed to

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Section: Qualitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Boyle’s Mechanical Philosophy

Jones¹

2020

Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences

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“…In fact, John Heil argues that color predicates do not denote properties, and consequently color properties are absent from "serious ontology" (2012: 153). But arguably, he is the one who is out of step with traditional metaphysics, since the nature of color has been discussed under the rubric of metaphysics for centuries, and continues to be so (Jackson 1929;Guerlac 1986;Puryear 2013). Colors are a paradigm case of the so-called secondary qualities, whose ontological status and connection to primary qualities has been debated since at least the Early Modern era.…”

Section: The Narrowness Of the "Mainstream" Conceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Feminist Metaphysics: Can This Marriage be Saved?

McKitrick¹

2018

The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism

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Feminist metaphysics is simultaneously feminist theorizing and metaphysics. Part of feminist metaphysics concerns social ontology and considers such questions as, What is the nature of social kinds, such as genders? Feminist metaphysicians also consider whether gendered perspectives influence metaphysical theorizing; for example, have approaches to the nature of the self or free will been conducted from a masculinist perspective, and would a feminist perspective yield different theories? Some feminist metaphysicians develop metaphysical theories with the aim of furthering certain social goals, such as gender equality.Despite these and other intriguing research projects, feminist metaphysics faces challenges from two flanks: one might argue that "feminist metaphysics" is not metaphysics, or one might argue that it is not feminist. Recently, Elizabeth Barnes (2014) has made the case that, since contemporary accounts of the nature of metaphysics focus primarily on the fundamental, they have the problematic implication that feminist metaphysics is not, properly speaking, metaphysics. However, less emphasis has been paid, of late, to the idea that major strands of feminist thought also problematize feminist metaphysics. I will briefly

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“…Before discussing such passages, I turn to the historically influential interpretation of Locke commonly thought to be provided by Berkeley and taken up by Reid, both of whom attribute (a)-(c) to Locke, amongst others. This interpretation has been shown decisively -in the work of Reginald Jackson (1929), Jonathan Bennett (1971, Edwin Curley (1972), and Peter Alexander (1985) -to be mistaken, though it is perhaps only dubiously to be found in Berkeley's work as a badly mistaken interpretation of Locke (Stroud 1980, Wilson 1982). …”

Section: Locke's Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Primary and Secondary Qualities

Wilson

2015

A Companion to Locke

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Locke’s Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Boyle’s Mechanical Philosophy

Boyle’s Mechanical Philosophy

Feminist Metaphysics: Can This Marriage be Saved?

Primary and Secondary Qualities

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