Logical and illogical behavior in animals¹

Abstract

Not only humans but also nonhuman animals show logical and illogical behavior. There are two typical areas of evidence for this: transitive inference and the formation of equivalence relations. Transitive inference has been observed in a broad range of subjects, suggesting that they share the evolutionary reasons that support transitive inference. On the other hand, while the formation of equivalence relations is typically found in human subjects, it appears to occur rarely in nonhuman subjects. In the case of pigeons, even if they are trained explicitly in equivalence, they do not subsequently exhibit equivalence relations. The performance of the sea lion represents the most reliable evidence of equivalence relations in nonhumans, suggesting that species-specific ecological properties support this particular cognition. These evidences suggest that in searching for the origin of logic, we should examine not only ontogenetic history, but also the phylogenetic history of the subjects.

Getting one step closer to deduction: Introducing an alternative paradigm for transitive inference

“…Whilst the B&T task generally shows itself to give positive results but is poor at distinguishing between groups, our alternative non-training single-response task offers to do both. Thus, it can contribute to issues such as which brain areas or functional neural systems play a primary role in deductive versus associative transitive inference, whether consciousness is Getting One Step Closer to Deduction 39 essential for deductive transitive inference, whether both forms of transitive inference are equally strongly related to language, whether the memory-independence effect applies to the deductive mode as well as associative mode, and which species are developing a deductive mode of transitive inference (Bara et al, 2001;Brainerd & Reyna, 1992;Goel et al, 2004;Martin & Alsop, 2004;Moses et al, 2006;Wright, 2001;Yamazaki, 2004). Of course it will definitively settle the original debate on the age children really become competent in deductive transitive inference (Holcomb et al, 1997;Wright, 2006a).…”

“…Then, since Bryant and Trabasso's original demonstrations, over 90% of transitive studies have followed the B&T methodology of training participants on at least four premise pairs, for as long as it takes to reach near perfect performance (e.g., Acuna, Sanes & Donoghue, 2002;Holcomb et al, 1997;Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006;Martin & Alsop, 2004;Wright, 2006b). Of great significance, in addition to unexpectedly high performance in other human groups (Maydak, Stromer, Mackay & Stoddard, 1995;Stromer, Mackay, Cohen & Stoddard, 1993), almost any non-human group tested has passed the B&T task: From as large as the beluga whale or the elephant (Archie et al, 2006;Murayama & Tobayama, 1997) to as small as the jay or honey bee (Bond et al, 2003;Shafir et al, 2002).Despite highly contrasting findings between the B&T task and its 3-term predecessor (e.g., on age of reaching competence), many insist B&T tasks target precisely the same "logical" competence as the Piagetian task (Acuna et al, 2002;Bouwmeester et al, 2007;Bryant, 1998;Halford & Andrews, 2004;Yamazaki, 2004). Intriguingly, no theorist seems yet to have offered any rationale for exactly why the B&T task which requires 10 premises to be stored in memory, involves five interlinked items, and tests for no less than six inferences, should either be equivalent to or easier to solve than the 3-term task requiring only one inference to be made.…”

“…Despite highly contrasting findings between the B&T task and its 3-term predecessor (e.g., on age of reaching competence), many insist B&T tasks target precisely the same "logical" competence as the Piagetian task (Acuna et al, 2002;Bouwmeester et al, 2007;Bryant, 1998;Halford & Andrews, 2004;Yamazaki, 2004). Intriguingly, no theorist seems yet to have offered any rationale for exactly why the B&T task which requires 10 premises to be stored in memory, involves five interlinked items, and tests for no less than six inferences, should either be equivalent to or easier to solve than the 3-term task requiring only one inference to be made.…”

“…Further, transitive tasks have been used as a tool in better understanding the similarities and differences between the mental processes of humans and nonhumans (Eichenbaum, 2001;Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006;Wu & Levy, 2001). It is for these Getting One Step Closer to Deduction 4 reasons among others, that some theorists argue that transitive inference potentially is an important window on cognition (Allen, 2006;Goel et al, 2004 (Brainerd & Reyna, 1992;Bryant, 1998;Bryson & Leong, 2007;Holcomb, Stromer & Mackay, 1997;Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006;Markovits & Dumas, 1992;McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992; Moses, Villate & Ryan, 2006;Russell, McCormack, Robinson & Lillis, 1996;Shafir, Waite & Smith, 2002;Siemann & Delius, 1996Yamazaki, 2004). The debates flourish because of the pivotal role transitive inference was afforded in Piagetian theory and the resultant close scrutiny of both (Bouwmeester, Vermunt & Sijtsma, 2007;Breslow, 1981;Chapman, 1999;Piaget, 1970).…”

Transitivity for height versus speed: To what extent do the under-7s really have a transitive capacity?

“…This training regime is arguably the most critical aspect of the task (Markovits & Dumas, 1992;Siegal, 2003), and it already subsumes the fact that series sizes are large (typically five or more items - Frank et al, 2005;Halford & Andrews, 2004;Martin & Alsop, 2004;Whelan, Barnes-Holmes & Dymond, 2006). To keep this critical (training) aspect salient, Yamazaki (2004) suggests we call this paradigm the "Extensive-Training-Paradigm".…”