Logical anti-exceptionalism and theoretical equivalence

Wigglesworth, John

doi:10.1093/analys/anx133

Analysis

2017

DOI: 10.1093/analys/anx133

|View full text |Cite

Logical anti-exceptionalism and theoretical equivalence

John Wigglesworth¹

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2020

2021

Publication Types

Select...

Article3

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent3

Authors

Journals

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…(Though, as I will note shortly in the main text, in other places these latter authors make claims that presuppose more than purely mathematical ambitions for sentential criteria.) The diagnosis is also suggested by work applying sentential criteria to different logics, such asWigglesworth (2017),Dewar (2018), andWoods (2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What theoretical equivalence could not be

Teitel

2021

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Formal criteria of theoretical equivalence are mathematical mappings between specific sorts of mathematical objects, notably including those objects used in mathematical physics. Proponents of formal criteria claim that results involving these criteria have implications that extend beyond pure mathematics. For instance, they claim that formal criteria bear on the project of using our best mathematical physics as a guide to what the world is like, and also have deflationary implications for various debates in the metaphysics of physics. In this paper, I investigate whether there is a defensible view according to which formal criteria have significant non-mathematical implications, of these sorts or any other, reaching a chiefly negative verdict. Along the way, I discuss various foundational issues concerning how we use mathematical objects to describe the world when doing physics, and how this practice should inform metaphysics. I diagnose the prominence of formal criteria as stemming from contentious views on these foundational issues, and endeavor to motivate some alternative views in their stead.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What theoretical equivalence could not be

Teitel

2021

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This is perhaps misleading, though, since Sider is not committed to the idea that logical equivalence entails theoretical equivalence.5 JohnWigglesworth (2017) and JackWoods (2018) both directly address a related, but actually distinct, question about the relationship between theoretical equivalence and anti-exceptionalism. Whereas I am concerned with what general stance about theoretical equivalence between scientific theories anti-exceptionalists should take, Wigglesworth and Woods are concerned about what anti-exceptionalists should think about the nature of and equivalence of logical theories themselves.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The cost of closure: logical realism, anti-exceptionalism, and theoretical equivalence

McSweeney

2021

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is commonly assumed by philosophers of science that logically equivalent theories are in fact theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not a priori, that it is revisable, and that it is not special or set apart from other human inquiry) and logical realism (which says, roughly, that differences in logic reflect genuine metaphysical differences in the world), make trouble for both this commitment and the closely related commitment to theories being closed under logical consequence. I provide three arguments. The first two show that anti-exceptionalism about logic provides an epistemic challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims; the third shows that logical realism provides a metaphysical challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims. Along the way, I show that there are important methodological upshots for metaphysicians and philosophers of logic. In particular, there are lessons to be drawn about certain conceptions of naturalism as constraining the possibilities for metaphysics and the philosophy of logic.

show abstract

“…The view that it is not, famously defended by Quine (), seems to experience a continuous rise in popularity. See for instance Hjortland (2016), Wigglesworth ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Not a Knot

Teijeiro

2020

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Here, I examine the connective called Knot, which may be considered a threat to semanticists, but not to inferentialists. I argue that it constitutes a problem for neither, by showing, first, how to characterize it proof‐theoretically, and second, by showing how the issues it allegedly poses for the semanticist rest on an imprecise understanding of metainferences. I conclude that one should be careful in grounding philosophical disputes merely on formal tools.

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

customersupport@researchsolutions.com

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

Logical anti-exceptionalism and theoretical equivalence

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

What theoretical equivalence could not be

What theoretical equivalence could not be

The cost of closure: logical realism, anti-exceptionalism, and theoretical equivalence

Not a Knot

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About