Logical anti‐exceptionalism meets the “logic‐as‐models” approach

Abstract

Logical anti-exceptionalism is the view that logic is not special, it is continuous with science. This continuity is typically understood in terms of the use of the abductive method in logical theory choice, with logical knowledge resulting from our choice of the theory best accounting for the data. In this paper, we argue for two related claims: (i) that this understanding of the continuity between logic and science faces considerable challenges; and (ii) that such challenges may be avoided by elaborating the continuity of logic with science in terms of the "logic-as-models" approach. More specifically, we defend that logical theories should be seen in the lights of the "models-as-epistemic-tools" approach, an approach to the nature of models in empirical science more closely connected with current scientific practice. The result is a version of logical anti-exceptionalism opening new perspectives for the philosophical understanding of logic.