2008
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9410-y
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Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts

Abstract: The paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are shown to be degraded versions of Bayes' theorem, once this is stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer these fallacies b… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…The second (pp. 346-348)-which invokes work by Floridi (2009) 13 Stone equates rejecting a claim c with (probably) accepting its logical complement non c, whereas Godden and Walton, as we saw in Sect. 3.3, take rejecting c to be consistent with either accepting non c or with taking no position.…”
Section: Recent Probabilistic Treatmentsmentioning
confidence: 86%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…The second (pp. 346-348)-which invokes work by Floridi (2009) 13 Stone equates rejecting a claim c with (probably) accepting its logical complement non c, whereas Godden and Walton, as we saw in Sect. 3.3, take rejecting c to be consistent with either accepting non c or with taking no position.…”
Section: Recent Probabilistic Treatmentsmentioning
confidence: 86%
“…We will first review an argument by Stone (2012) and in the following section turn to Floridi (2009). Stone takes DA arguments to have force well beyond undermining an opponent's position.…”
Section: Recent Probabilistic Treatmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…When evaluating particular content-saturations of AC and DA structures against the standard of probability theory, however, the validity of such arguments is seen to depend on the specific probability values that are assigned to premises and conclusion [see Floridi, 2009;Godden and Zenker, 2015;Hahn and Oaksford, 2006a,b]). Notice that, on a probabilistic account, validity judgements do not seem to vary with contexts, but depend only on the probability values assigned to argument contents.…”
Section: De-contextualizationmentioning
confidence: 99%