Logical Omniscience

Égré, Paul

doi:10.1002/9781118788516.sem034

The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Semantics 2020

DOI: 10.1002/9781118788516.sem034

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Logical Omniscience

Paul Égré

Abstract: The problem of logical omniscience is the fact that believe and other attitude verbs in possible‐worlds semantics are predicted to be closed under logical consequence, in ways that appear implausibly strong, both relative to how beliefs are represented and relative to how they are ascribed in ordinary language. This chapter explains the problem and surveys four main strategies that have been proposed to deal with it, by means of primitive propositions, of impossible worlds, of structure… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications

References 49 publications

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Combining Probabilities with Full Beliefs

Hansson

2024

Erkenn

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One of the major problems in formal epistemology is the difficulty of combining probabilistic and dichotomous (all-or-nothing) beliefs in one and the same formal framework. Based on the properties of actual human belief systems, a set of ten desiderata is proposed for belief system models that contain both probabilistic and full beliefs. Previously proposed combined belief systems are shown to fall short of these desiderata. A proof of concept is provided to show that they can be satisfied in a formal model. In the proposed model, the amnesia problem of probabilistic updating is solved by introducing infinitesimal probabilities as carriers of memories of beliefs that have been given up. In the resulting system of probability revision, contingent propositions can be transferred in both directions between full beliefs and beliefs held to a lower degree, in a way that mirrors real-life acquisitions and losses of full beliefs. The subsystem consisting of full beliefs has a pattern of change that constitutes a credible system of dichotomous belief change.

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Combining Probabilities with Full Beliefs

Hansson

2024

Erkenn

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A hyperintensional approach to positive epistemic possibility

Rossi,

Özgün

2023

Synthese

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The received view says that possibility is the dual of necessity: a proposition is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc.) possible iff it is not the case that its negation is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc., respectively) necessary. This reading is usually taken for granted by modal logicians and indeed seems plausible when dealing with logical or metaphysical possibility. But what about epistemic possibility? We argue that the dual definition of epistemic possibility in terms of epistemic necessity generates tension when reasoning about non-idealized agents and is a problem of concern for most hyperintensional epistemic logics that alleviate the problem of logical omniscience. The tension is particularly evident when knowledge is taken as a primitive to define other epistemic concepts, such as justification and belief, as done in the knowledge-first tradition. We propose a non-dual interpretation of epistemic possibility, employing a hyperintensionality filter similar to the one that makes the corresponding epistemic necessity operator hyperintensional. We employ the proposed semantics to model Stalnaker’s belief as epistemic possibility of knowledge and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a hyperintensional version of his bimodal logic of knowledge and belief.

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Non-doxastic Attitude Reports, Information Structure, and Semantic-Pragmatic Interface

Rostworowski,

Kuś,

Maćkiewicz

2024

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Truth conditions of sentences ascribing non-doxastic propositional attitudes seem to depend on the information structure of the embedded clause. In this paper, we argue that this kind of sensitivity is a semantic phenomenon rather than a pragmatic one. We report four questionnaire studies which explore the impact of the information structure on the truth conditions of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions from different perspectives. The results of the first two studies show that the acceptability of those ascriptions can be affected by some structural modifications of the embedded clause, in particular, when we replace a simple form by an equivalent complex conjunctional form (‘p and q’). However, it is possible that different evaluations of such ascriptions have a pragmatic source, namely, the ascriptions with embedded conjunction imply that the agent’s attitude transfers to both conjuncts. In the second pair of studies, we further investigate the nature of this implication which can be classified as ‘Conjunction Elimination’ (CE) in the scope of an attitude verb. The results show that CE-inferences in the context of non-factive non-doxastic attitude ascriptions are not easily cancellable and hence of a semantic rather than pragmatic nature. The results are not conclusive when it comes to the factive non-doxastic attitudes. We conclude our findings by some considerations about a potential source of the observed difference between non-factive and factive attitude verbs and the significance of our general findings to the semantic theory of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions.

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Logical Omniscience

Cited by 3 publications

References 49 publications

Combining Probabilities with Full Beliefs

Combining Probabilities with Full Beliefs

A hyperintensional approach to positive epistemic possibility

Non-doxastic Attitude Reports, Information Structure, and Semantic-Pragmatic Interface

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