Logical reasoning, world knowledge, and mental imagery: Interconnections in cognitive processes

Abstract

To better understand the role of problem content in verbal reasoning, the effect of two aspects of problem representation on conditional reasoning was examined. Specifically, this study focused on the effect of availability of knowledge schemata and mental imagery on recognition of indeterminacy. Four groups of20 adults solved syllogisms that varied in imagery value and in tendency to access knowledge schemata (assessed by ratings of the relatedness of antecedent and consequent clauses of premises). When problems both were high in imagery value and had related clauses, performance was significantly better on indeterminate syllogisms. Access to schemata may permit elaborative processing and the generation of counterexamples to invalid inferences; imagery may support representation of problems and generation of elaborative information in memory.

Visual imagery can impede reasoning

“…In our analysis, the three relations can all be represented spatially. The same explanation can account for Clement and Falmagne's (1986) results. They studied conditional reasoning and varied the imageability and availability of pertinent knowledge.…”

“…Likewise, Clement and Falmagne (1986) found that materials rated as easy to imagine led to fewer errors in verbal reasoning (at least, if the materials related to knowledge). With a different procedure, Pearson, Logie, and Gilhooly (1999) found that a visual secondary task interfered with a primary task of reasoning-related mental synthesis.…”

Reasoning and the Visual-Impedance Hypothesis

“…This view is supported by various sorts of evidence including the well-known studies of the mental rotation and the mental scanning of images (Shepard and Cooper, 1982;Kosslyn, 1980). Moreover, several studies have shown that reasoning depends on the ease of imagining the premises, the instructions to form images, and the participants' ability to form images (e.g., Shaver, Pierson, and Lang, 1976;Clement and Falmagne, 1986). In contrast, however, other studies have failed to detect any effect of imageability on reasoning.…”

Phonological and visual distinctiveness effects in syllogistic reasoning: Implications for mental models theory

“…The research of Knauff and colleagues has been particularly valuable in revealing a potential problem with previous studies that have demonstrated inconsistent links between imagery and deduction (e.g., Clement & Falmagne, 1986;De Soto, London, & Handel, 1965;Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Tabossi, 1989;Shaver, Pierson, & Lang, 1975;Sternberg, 1980). Knauff and Johnson-Laird (2002) suggested that this inconsistency derives from an inherent confounding in such studies between materials invoking visual imagery and materials invoking spatial representations.…”