Logical Relations between Pictures

Westerhoff, Jan

doi:10.5840/jphil20051021210

Cited by 28 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…While arguing in favour of two-sources accounts, Moroni and Lorini go back to a paper by Westerhoff on the logical relationships between pictures. (Westerhoff 2005) discusses Venn-diagrams to claim we have logical relations between pictures, i.e. non-linguistic entities (actually Westerhoff calls them "non-sentential").…”

Section: Non-linguistic Propositions Norms-as-propositions and Legalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Propositions as (non-linguistic) objects and philosophy of law: Norms-as-propositions

Feis

2020

Filoz drus

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The paper distinguishes two accounts of legal normativity. One-source accounts claim there is only one source for legal normativity, which is ultimately linguistic. Two-source accounts claim legal normativity is both linguistic and non-linguistic. Two-source accounts claim we need to go beyond language and beyond propositions taken as linguistic entities, while they are one-source accounts? main conceptual tool. Both accounts construct propositions as linguistic. There is, nevertheless, a documented analytic tradition starting with G.E. Moore that constructs propositions as non-linguistic entities. Today, the problem of the unity of proposition and structured propositions are highly debated in metaphysics. How does such debates fit into the one-source vs. two-source picture of legal normativity? Why has analytic legal philosophy failed to consider such an option concerning propositions (arguably calling descriptive sentences about norms ?normative propositions? did not help)? This paper thus (I) reconstructs the argumentative dynamics between one-source and two-source accounts; (II) presents the less considered philosophical view of propositions as non-linguistic entities and (III) discusses how to include or dismiss such a philosophical view in the one-source/two-source debate on legal normativity.

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Section: Non-linguistic Propositions Norms-as-propositions and Legalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Propositions as (non-linguistic) objects and philosophy of law: Norms-as-propositions

Feis

2020

Filoz drus

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“…Inquiry into this question is still at its beginnings. Some first indications on how to proceed are provided by the pioneering works by Franciszek Studnicki (1970), Jan Westerhoff (2005) and Elisabeth Camp (2007). These studies suggest that pictorial systems – and not sentential systems alone – employ recurrent parts and use systematic combinatorial rules.…”

Section: Four Main Questions On Graphic Rules: Logics Semantics Pramentioning

confidence: 99%

Graphic rules in planning: A critical exploration of normative drawings starting from zoning maps and form-based codes

Moroni

Lorini

2016

Planning Theory

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This article is focused on the rules that we create using drawings (designs, pictures, paintings,\ud etc.) which will be termed ‘graphic rules’. Its attention is therefore not simply on the use of\ud images in normative documents but also ‘as law’. We will delve into one of these types of graphic\ud rules: that is, graphic rules used in urban planning. The fact that graphic rules are widespread in\ud planning practices, and indeed typical of them, makes rules of this kind a particularly significant\ud field of interest for planning theory. An important point to stress is that while analysis of images\ud used descriptively has been under way for some time (although in many respects it is anything\ud but conclusive, despite what is generally thought), analysis of images used as rules is still in its\ud infancy. To gain deeper understanding of these particular and widespread forms of (graphic) rules\ud is therefore both theoretically and practically important

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“…People routinely think mereological relations (e.g., composition) hold between things from other categories: regions (see above); numbers and mathematical objects (Bell 2004; Parsons 2007, 205n3); events (Mellor 1998, 86; Rea 2003, 249; Turetzky 1998, 131–132; inter alia ); properties (Hawthorne and Sider 2003, 32; van Cleve 1985, 264); facts (Koons 1997); structured universals (Lewis 1986b and Hawley forthcoming both discuss them as possibilities, although Lewis opts against them); actions (Chant 2006); abstract pictures (Westerhoff 2005); and some think anything at all can stand in mereological relations (Armstrong 1989, 92; Lewis 1986a, 212n9; Sider 2007).…”

Section: Unrestricted Mereological Composition (Umc)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Universalism and Classes

Effingham

2011

Dialectica

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Universalism (the thesis that distinct objects always compose a further object) has come under much scrutiny in recent years. What has been largely ignored is its role in the metaphysics of classes. Not only does universalism provide ways to deal with classes in a metaphysically pleasing fashion, its success on these grounds has been offered as a motivation for believing it. This paper argues that such treatments of classes can be achieved without universalism, examining theories from Goodman and Quine, Armstrong and Lewis. In the case of each theory, universalism is drafted in to ensure that there are enough material objects to play a particular role. I argue that, for each theory, there's a better theory that ditches universalism and instead uses an alternative principle of composition demanding that the unrestricted composition of entities other than material objects (respectively: regions, states of affairs and singletons) play that role instead. I conclude that (1) non-universalists can consider accepting such theories of classes and (2) we should ignore any alleged motivation for universalism on the basis of dealing with classes.

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Logical Relations between Pictures

Cited by 28 publications

References 7 publications

Propositions as (non-linguistic) objects and philosophy of law: Norms-as-propositions

Propositions as (non-linguistic) objects and philosophy of law: Norms-as-propositions

Graphic rules in planning: A critical exploration of normative drawings starting from zoning maps and form-based codes

Universalism and Classes

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