Arguments, the story goes, have one or more premises and only one conclusion. A contentious generalisation allows arguments with several disjunctively connected conclusions. Contentious as this generalisation may be, I will argue nevertheless that it is justified. My main claim is that multiple conclusions are epiphenomena of the logical connectives: some connectives determine, in a certain sense, multiple-conclusion derivations. Therefore, such derivations are completely natural and can safely be used in proof-theoretic semantics. Keywords multiple conclusions • defining rules • structure of derivations • logical inferentialism Delta: [.. . ] He seems engrossed in the production of monstrosities. But monstrosities never foster growth, either in world of nature or in the world of thought. Gamma: Geneticists can easily refute that. Have you not heard that mutations producing monstrosities play a considerable role in macro-evolution? They call such monstrous mutants 'hopeful monsters'. Lakatos, Proofs and refutations, pp. 21-22 1 Preamble An argument has one or more premises and one conclusion. Thus goes the orthodox stance. In this paper, I will defend the heretical claim that an argument may have