Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control

Mumy, Gene E.

doi:10.1007/bf00154749

Cited by 19 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…This comparison focuses especially on the expected administrative, political and economic characteristics of a control instrument which was analysed above but does not yet exist in practice: the emission tax threshold which is a property right rather than a subsidy. Our conclusion is simple but contentious, and is worth stating now: Rather than being written off as counterintuitive, or impossible because it has never yet been implemented, the tax-threshold-as-property-right, an idea first proposed by Mumy (1980), deserves further investigation, particularly for GHG control.…”

Section: Discussion Of Assumptions Made About Tax Thresholds or Free mentioning

confidence: 84%

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Pezzey

2003

Environmental and Resource Economics

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We compare three different views on the long run efficiencies of emission taxes which include thresholds, and of tradable emission permits where some permits are initially free. The differences are caused by different assumptions about whether thresholds and free permits should be subsidies given only to firms that produce, or full property rights. Treating tax thresholds, as well as free permits, as property rights would depart from the conventional view, but would allow greater flexibility in making economic instruments both efficient and acceptable. Such flexibility could be very important in achieving efficent control of greenhouse gas emissions.

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Section: Discussion Of Assumptions Made About Tax Thresholds or Free mentioning

confidence: 84%

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Pezzey

2003

Environmental and Resource Economics

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“…NOTES 1. See Baumol and Oates (1975), Carlton and Loury (1980), Cordes (1980) and Mumy (1980) for a sample of different conclusions regarding these corrective devices. 2.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The social choice of alternative corrective devices

Mestelman

1984

Public Choice

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“…This could occur because existing firms earn higher profits (rent) from the credit than without the credit and thus inefficiently exit the industry. Pezzey (1992) has discussed how the firm could be theoretically compensated for its environmental asset holdings if it exits the industry and Mumy (1980) suggests that the financial incentives could be traded. However, even accepting the theoretical possibility of inefficient exit with some kinds of tax credit programs, a second question is its relevance to policy.…”

Section: Tax Credits and The Number Of Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Modifications to the tax system, the implementation of tradable permits, or mixed (two-tier) tax and trade systems have been suggested to improve economic efficiency major concern in Central and Eastern Europe: (1) raising pollution tax rates to behaviorally relevant levels, and (2) doing so without extracting so much in taxation that socially expensive closures result. Related proposals have been discussed in the North American literature by Mumy (1980), Pezzey (1992), and Farrow (1995). The existence of environmental taxes in Central and Eastern Europe may make such proposals more relevant than in North America where such a foundation does not exist.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The duality of taxes and tradable permits: A survey with applications in Central and Eastern Europe

Farrow

1999

Envir. Dev. Econ.

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Economic instruments such as taxes and tradable permits have been promoted as efficiency improving policies in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The little noticed potential for a symmetric equity impact from the two instruments in a world without distortions is first discussed. A specific policy option is suggested in which existing environmental taxes in Central and Eastern Europe can be increased without imposing additional financial burdens in industry if appropriate tax credits are provided. Second, conditions in Central and Eastern Europe are identified that reduce the change of efficiency losses in a general equilibrium setting when distortions exist. The trade-off between efficiency and equity in such a setting is found to depend on country-specific parameters and to be reduced if: (1) a cost-effective policy is implemented, (2) environmental assets can be distributed prior to privatization, and (3) government expenditures can decline.

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Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control

Cited by 19 publications

References 8 publications

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The social choice of alternative corrective devices

The duality of taxes and tradable permits: A survey with applications in Central and Eastern Europe

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