2006
DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2005.03.007
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Long-term audit engagements and opinion shopping: Spanish evidence

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

4
12
0

Year Published

2006
2006
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
1
1

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 25 publications
(16 citation statements)
references
References 26 publications
4
12
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Proponents of mandatory rotation argue that imposing mandatory limits on auditor tenure improves audit quality by reducing clients' influence over auditors or auditor complacency (e.g., Turner 2002;Brody and Moscove 1998;SEC 1994;AICPA 1978;U.S. Opponents of mandatory rotation argue that substandard audits occur more frequently for newer clients because auditors have less information about these firms (Stanley and DeZoort 2007;Carcello and Nagy 2004;Johnson et al 2002;Walker et al 2001;AICPA 1992); or the newly appointed auditors, concerned with recovering startup costs, are more easily influenced by the client during early years of an audit engagement (Ruiz- Barbadillo et al 2006;Geiger and Raghunandan 2002). Opponents of mandatory rotation argue that substandard audits occur more frequently for newer clients because auditors have less information about these firms (Stanley and DeZoort 2007;Carcello and Nagy 2004;Johnson et al 2002;Walker et al 2001;AICPA 1992); or the newly appointed auditors, concerned with recovering startup costs, are more easily influenced by the client during early years of an audit engagement (Ruiz- Barbadillo et al 2006;Geiger and Raghunandan 2002).…”
Section: Audit Firm Rotationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Proponents of mandatory rotation argue that imposing mandatory limits on auditor tenure improves audit quality by reducing clients' influence over auditors or auditor complacency (e.g., Turner 2002;Brody and Moscove 1998;SEC 1994;AICPA 1978;U.S. Opponents of mandatory rotation argue that substandard audits occur more frequently for newer clients because auditors have less information about these firms (Stanley and DeZoort 2007;Carcello and Nagy 2004;Johnson et al 2002;Walker et al 2001;AICPA 1992); or the newly appointed auditors, concerned with recovering startup costs, are more easily influenced by the client during early years of an audit engagement (Ruiz- Barbadillo et al 2006;Geiger and Raghunandan 2002). Opponents of mandatory rotation argue that substandard audits occur more frequently for newer clients because auditors have less information about these firms (Stanley and DeZoort 2007;Carcello and Nagy 2004;Johnson et al 2002;Walker et al 2001;AICPA 1992); or the newly appointed auditors, concerned with recovering startup costs, are more easily influenced by the client during early years of an audit engagement (Ruiz- Barbadillo et al 2006;Geiger and Raghunandan 2002).…”
Section: Audit Firm Rotationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If the firm receives a clean report, then the probability that the incumbent auditor will be retained is high, while the opposite occurs in the case of qualified audit opinions (Krishnan, 1994; Krishnan & Stepens, 1995; Lennox, 2000). Hence, there are economic incentives for auditors to issue an unqualified opinion in order to retain large clients (Stice, 1991; Lys & Watts, 1994; Ruiz‐Barbadillo et al ., 2005) as prior empirical evidence documents a positive relationship between size and audit fees both in the industrial (e.g. Chan et al ., 1993; Brinn et al ., 1994; Che‐Ahmad & Houghton, 1996; Pasiouras et al ., 2005b) and financial (Fields et al ., 2004) sectors.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The risk of losing confidence from investors encourages the management to try to acquire and maintain an unqualified opinion 21 . Problems arise when a company does not have high quality financial statements to support the unqualified opinion 1 .This means management must find other efforts to obtain/maintain the desired opinion.…”
Section: The Effect Of Abnormal Audit Fee On the Probability Of Determentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on previous research, it is assumed that only companies who need to retain the auditor's opinion without a reliable financial statement base will conduct opinion shopping 1,[20][21][22] . Opinion shopping occurs during negotiations, whereby the auditor encourages management to approve the accounting practices conducted by the management with the threat of dismissal 22 .…”
Section: The Effect Of Abnormal Audit Fee On the Probability Of Determentioning
confidence: 99%