Long-term implementation of the cooperative solution in a multistage multicriteria game

Kuzyutin, Denis; Smirnova, Nadezhda; Gromova, Ekaterina

doi:10.1016/j.orp.2019.100107

Cited by 16 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…The above condition is clear: if both firms give too much weight to their environmental objective, then they do not need to accumulate capital, because doing so will lead to an increase in pollution. Condition (8) will hold for large a, because then the market is profitable. It will not hold for large λ 2 , because firm 1 does not like to pollute and therefore reduces investments.…”

Section: Optimality Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Third, among the objectives pursued by the players, one is especially environmental (whereas we may think that in Rettieva's setting players actually have two economic objectives). (This paper is related to, but also differs from, the papers by Kuzyutin, Gromova and Pankratova [7,8] who develop a cooperative game theory approach of dynamic multi-criteria decision analysis and who pay special attention to the time-consistency issue).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Dynamic Multi-Objective Duopoly Game with Capital Accumulation and Pollution

2021

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This paper studies a discrete-time dynamic duopoly game with homogenous goods. Both firms have to decide on investment where investment increases production capacity so that they are able to put a larger quantity on the market. The downside, however, is that a larger quantity raises pollution. The firms have multiple objectives in the sense that each one maximizes the discounted profit stream and appreciates a clean environment as well. We obtain some surprising results. First, where it is known from the continuous-time differential game literature that firms invest more under a feedback information structure compared to an open-loop one, we detect scenarios where the opposite holds. Second, in a feedback Nash equilibrium, capital stock is more sensitive to environmental appreciation than in the open-loop case.

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Section: Optimality Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Multi-Objective Duopoly Game with Capital Accumulation and Pollution

2021

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“…20 The concepts of bureaucratic biasness and motivation were developed by Prendergast. 21 Kuzyutin et al 22 developed a long-term implementation model using the concepts of cooperative solution in a multistage multicriteria game.…”

Section: Review Of Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Solution of an imperfect‐quality EOQ model with backorder under fuzzy lock leadership game approach

Mahata

2020

Int J Intell Syst

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“…An individually rational method to determine cooperative behavior in dynamic multicriteria games was presented in [34,35]. Kuzyutin et al [40,41] developed a cooperative game theory for dynamic multistage multicriteria games. However, there is no universally accepted solution concept for multi-objective problems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Multicriteria Game with Pollution Externalities

Rettieva

2022

Mathematics

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The multicriteria approach deals with real-life applications of game theory. However, the existing game-theoretic statements with the joint analysis of resource extraction and pollution dynamics have not considered the multiple objectives of the players. To address this issue, a dynamic multicriteria game is proposed: many players exploit a common resource and seek to optimize different criteria under pollution externalities. Two interconnected state variables (resource stock and pollution level) are introduced and studied. The pollution level depends on exploitation strategies, and the players have an environmental objective to reduce the accumulated pollution. The noncooperative and cooperative behavioral strategies of the players are analyzed. A linear dynamic multicriteria bioresource management problem with pollution externalities is investigated to illustrate the solution concepts proposed. The differences between the noncooperative and cooperative cases, as well as between the models with and without environmentally concerned players, are treated analytically and numerically. As shown by the results, the cooperative behavior reduces pollution in both statements, bringing to sparing bioresource exploitation.

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Long-term implementation of the cooperative solution in a multistage multicriteria game

Cited by 16 publications

References 24 publications

A Dynamic Multi-Objective Duopoly Game with Capital Accumulation and Pollution

A Dynamic Multi-Objective Duopoly Game with Capital Accumulation and Pollution

Solution of an imperfect‐quality EOQ model with backorder under fuzzy lock leadership game approach

Dynamic Multicriteria Game with Pollution Externalities

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