Look again: Phenomenology and mental imagery

Abstract

This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science;(3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett's heterophenomenology.

Heterophenomenology reconsidered

“…When Evan Thompson discusses this issue, he says my insistence on interpreting a subject's remarks as somehow about subpersonal brain events belies the neutrality I claim: "The bias of this approach is that it demands we interpret subjects as expressing beliefs not simply about 'what is going on inside them' but about 'what is going on inside them subpersonally' " (Thompson, 2007). As he notes, Descriptive reports carry no particular [my emphasis -DCD] commitments on the part of the subject about what is going on in his or her brain.…”

“…So a key element of my proposal is to insist that one side of the bridge be firmly anchored to the same objective perspective that reigns in the sciences that aspire to explain such unproblematically physical phenomena as continental drift, biodiversity and metabolism. This is what I call the third-person perspective, but Evan Thompson suggests it is more properly called impersonal (Thompson, 2007). Well, impersonal regarding atoms and molecules and land masses, maybe, but third-personal when dealing with the digestive tract, the muscle-tone and the center-of-mass of a person, for instance.…”

“…(Thompson, 2007). That is why I went to such lengths to describe those methods in terms that the natural sciences could -and ought to -honor.…”

“…For instance, I was surprised to see Thompson yielding to the temptation to engage in a little implied guilt-by-association. Does heterophenomenology, as he warns, "amount to a kind of positivism" (Thompson, 2007)? He is entirely right that my proposal is in the spirit of positivism, as I have just explained, but if heterophenomenology is a kind of positivism, it is an as yet untarnished, unrefuted kind of positivism, a kind that is alive and well and deservedly respected wherever science is taken seriously.…”

“…But he goes on to say "On the other hand, given its resolutely thirdperson attitude, there is nothing in heterophenomenology that would lead it ever to envision -let alone take the step -of working with experience in this direct and firstpersonal phenomenological way." (Thompson, 2007). Well, I don't see why, but if the charge can thus be reduced to something no worse than misdirection, I'll plead guilty so we can get on with more important matters.…”