Looking beyond conventional intergovernmental fiscal frameworks: principles, realities, and neglected issues

Abstract

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The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

“…Funding alone is not enough to support lagging regions in their efforts to improve outcomes and catch up with other parts of the country. Strengthening the capacity of subnational units to improve education outcomes often goes hand-in-hand with reform of the transfer system (Smoke 2017). Capacity building programs should avoid central "supply-driven" approaches that are mechanical, standardized, and technical and that ignore unique subnational needs and governance environments (Smoke 2017).…”

“…Strengthening the capacity of subnational units to improve education outcomes often goes hand-in-hand with reform of the transfer system (Smoke 2017). Capacity building programs should avoid central "supply-driven" approaches that are mechanical, standardized, and technical and that ignore unique subnational needs and governance environments (Smoke 2017). In Brazil, providing technical assistance to states and municipalities was a key feature in the introduction of the performance-based grant and helped increase the impact of the transfer .…”

“…The sheer number of involved parties creates challenges for grant design and execution. For example, the clarity and consistency of transfer goals may easily be sacrificed as the number of stakeholders involved in grant design rises, objectives multiply, and the inevitable political compromises are made (Smoke 2017). Some education sector grant authorities may expressly avoid transparency in setting objectives so that the parties involved are free to read their own interpretations into the stated ambitions.…”

Strengthening India's Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers:

“…In addition to the countries covered in this report, Asian Development Bank (ADB) reports by Martínez-Vázquez (2011b) and Smoke (2016) provide a review of the fiscal decentralization experience in other Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in the South Asia region; and Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam in the Southeast Asian region.…”