Losing out on substance but winning procedurally? The European Parliament and accountability in crisis legislation

Abstract

Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union's response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its oversight powers over executive bodies in the implementation of crisis legislation. This article systematically assesses the conditions under which the EP has been successful in increasing its account-holding powers, using new data on the accountability provisions included in economic and financial legislation put forward between 2009 and 2014. It is found that Parliament has indeed been more likely to gain oversight powers in crisis legislation. Levels of accountability are also higher in package deals and more salient legislation. The findings here provide a more nuanced picture of Parliament's inter-institutional gains and losses in recent years and give more insight into the EP's account-holding role.

The Recovery and Resilience Dialogues: Cheap Talk or Effective Oversight?

“…The "economic dialogue" has been introduced by the legislation reforming economic governance, the sixand the two-pack (i.e., Bressanelli & Chelotti, 2016;Kluger Dionigi & Koop, 2019). Through it, the ECON Committee invites representatives of the member states, the European Commission, the president of the Council, and the president of the Eurogroup to discuss economic and policy issues.…”

Pragmatism and the Limits to the European Parliament’s Strategies for Self-Empowerment

“…Within this context, the EP has systematically attempted to maximise its prerogatives and accountholding powers (Bressanelli & Chelotti, 2016;Héritier, 2017;O'Keeffe et al, 2016;Rittberger, 2014). Sometimes, concessions in these areas partially compensate the EP for its lack of substantial influence in the design of key legislation (Dionigi, 2020;Dionigi & Koop, 2019). Additionally, these ad hoc concessions may create an incrementalist process (Benedetto & Hix, 2007;Hix, 2002), which results in the EP using the new prerogatives to propose an expansive interpretation of the rules to further extend its powers.…”