Loss Aversion and Risk-Seeking in Korea–japan Relations

Abstract

Since Korea's transition to democracy in 1987, Korean leaders have become increasingly confrontational toward Japan, with such steps ranging from verbal threats filled with hawkish rhetoric to material threats, such as displays of military force and threats of actually using it. To explain South Korean leaders’ hawkish approach to Japan, we build a theory of “prospective diversion” by combining insights from the diversionary theory of international conflict and prospect theory. We argue that foreign policy leaders have a strong tendency to overvalue political losses relative to comparable gains in their approval ratings. As a result, they are inclined to take risk-seeking diplomatic actions toward foreign adversary to avoid further losses. By conducting statistical analyses and developing case studies of Korean leaders’ confrontational policy decisions regarding Japan, we present empirical findings consistent with our hypothesis that Korean leaders are inclined to engage in prospective diversion toward Japan when they suffer domestic losses. This article provides an enhanced understanding of the domestic political foundation of South Korean leaders’ increasingly contentious attitude toward Japan.

Godzilla vs Pulgasari: Anti-Japanism and Anti-Communism as Dueling Antagonisms in South Korean Politics

“…My argument has some parallels with that of You and Kim (2020), who argue that Korean leaders pursue "diversionary" confrontation toward Japan when faced with rising disapproval over other issues. Their analysis is ideologically agnostic and finds this diversionary tactic to apply consistently across multiple administrations.…”

“…While I agree that liberal administrations may use anti-Japan diversion to counter various vulnerabilities, I contend that it is the only weapon in their arsenal emotionally potent enough to be effective against conservative anti-communism. Further, my theory challenges two of You and Kim's control assumptions—that an increase in contentious actions by North Korea will have a dampening effect on anti-Japan hostility, and that “hawks” (defined as the right) will be more confrontational toward Japan (You and Kim 2020, 59–60). Section 5 will show how both assumptions have proven unreliable at several junctures since 2012.…”

“…Our first focus episode covers the period around conservative President Lee Myung-bak's August 2012 visit to Dokdo. This period presents an important test case because it preceded a very contentious presidential election, and as mentioned many scholars point to Lee's Dokdo trip as the primary evidence of Korean bipartisan alignment on Japan issues (Lai 2020, You and Kim 2020).…”

“…Triggered by a South Korean Supreme Court ruling on Japanese war reparations and coinciding with a near withdrawal from GSOMIA (the security agreement with Japan that passed in 2016), this series of events presents a good test as it brings our dueling antagonisms into direct confrontation in a period of peak partisan competition. It also constitutes the greatest challenge yet to existing theoretical expectations for South Korea to prioritize security and trade above anti-Japan sentiment in a time of “dovish” leadership and declining US commitment to bankroll Korea's security (Cha 1999, You and Kim 2020).…”

The citizen preferences–positive externality trade-off: A survey study of COVID-19 vaccine deployment in Japan

“…For China, the Japanese archipelago is located at the gateway to the Western Pacific, resulting in increased tension between China and the US–Japan alliance ( Erickson & Wuthnow, 2016 ; Fanell, 2019 ), adding to territorial disputes ( Pajon, 2017 ). Although South Korea is an ally of the US, its citizens have anti-Japanese sentiments due to Japan’s annexation of Korea from 1910 to 1945; these feelings are embedded in and enhanced by domestic political dynamism ( You & Kim, 2020 ), and Japanese citizens recognize this. In summary, Japan maintained geopolitically good prepandemic relationships with the US, Europe, and Taiwan but not necessarily with China or South Korea.…”