Loss of Self-Control in Intertemporal Choice May Be Attributable to Logarithmic Time-Perception

Takahashi, Takehiro

doi:10.1007/978-4-431-55402-8_5

Cited by 26 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…The subadditive model is consistent with a wide range of empirical results (Glimcher and Kable, 2007;Kable and Glimcher, 2010;McAlvanah, 2010;Read, 2001;Read and Roelofsma, 2003), although it may be that both subadditive and hyperbolic discounting work together (see Scholten and Read, 2006). The idea that distortions in time perception drive intertemporal choice (at least in part) is now well established (Takahashi, 2005;Zauberman et al, 2009).…”

Section: Functional Forms and Inconsistencysupporting

confidence: 66%

The Cambridge Handbook of Psychology and Economic Behaviour

Lewis¹

2018

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Section: Functional Forms and Inconsistencysupporting

confidence: 66%

The Cambridge Handbook of Psychology and Economic Behaviour

Lewis¹

2018

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“…Models with psychometric distortions posit that time and risk are perceived with psychological distortions that tend to generate present-focused preferences. For example, suppose time is perceived with a concave (subjective) transformation (as argued by Read 2001, Takahashi 2005, Ebert and Prelec 2007, and Zauberman et al 2009. To fix ideas, suppose that agents discount with an exponential discount function, , but that they perceive objective time, t, with a concave transformation .…”

Section: Models With Psychometric Distortionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intertemporal Choice

Ericson¹,

Laibson²

2018

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Intertemporal tradeoffs play a key role in many personal decisions and policy questions. We describe models of intertemporal choice, identify empirical regularities in choice, and pose new questions for research. The focus for intertemporal choice research is no longer whether the exponential discounted utility model is empirically accurate, but, instead, what models best explain the robust behavioral deviations we observe. We introduce the term "present-focused preferences" to describe the large class of models that prioritize present flows of experienced utility. Present-focused preferences need not coincide with a preference for commitment or dynamically inconsistent preferences. Present-bias is a special case of present-focused preferences.

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“…where V (D), A, and D stay the same, r q and q are discount parameters of the model [21]. For q → 1, q-exponential discount recovers the classical exponential discount.…”

Section: Quasi Hyperbolic Discountingmentioning

confidence: 93%