Lovely but dangerous: The impact of patent citations on patent renewal

Maurseth, Per Botolf

doi:10.1080/1043859042000307338

Cited by 50 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…A third strand of literature draws on the previous by taking the proposed indicators and correlates for granted and exploiting them to investigate different determinants of or patterns in patent value van Pottelsberghe 2000 2002;Maurseth 2005;.…”

Section: Value Indicators: What Are They and What Do They Tell Us?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The puzzle of patent value indicators

Zeebroeck

2011

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

162

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Given the growing size of patent databases and portfolios, scholars and practitioners alike need metrics to help them in weighting patent counts or in ranking patents to focus on the most important ones. The main objective of this paper is to help them in this task with a practical and replicable approach. The discriminating criterion chosen is the potential market for the patented invention and the approach uses five different patent features (forward citations, grant decisions, families, renewals, and oppositions) that (1) have been found positively correlated with the value of patents in the literature, (2) can be extracted from patent databases, and (3) could inform on the existence of a potential market for the invention. The paper therefore discusses the main methodological issues in measuring and interpreting these metrics over a large international dataset and proposes one approach to extract from the different measures a consistent score that can be used to weight or rank patents. AbstractGiven the growing size of patent databases and portfolios, scholars and practitioners alike need metrics to help them in weighting patent counts or in ranking patents to focus on the most important ones. The main objective of this paper is to help them in this task with a practical and replicable approach. The discriminating criterion chosen is the potential market for the patented invention and the approach uses five different patent features (forward citations, grant decisions, families, renewals, and oppositions) that (1) have been found positively correlated with the value of patents in the literature, (2) can be extracted from patent databases, and (3) could inform on the existence of a potential market for the invention. The paper therefore discusses the main methodological issues in measuring and interpreting these metrics over a large international dataset and proposes one approach to extract from the different measures a consistent score that can be used to weight or rank patents.

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Section: Value Indicators: What Are They and What Do They Tell Us?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The puzzle of patent value indicators

Zeebroeck

2011

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

162

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“…As previously noted; Irrespective of how the success, or the value, of patents has been measured, these studies have seldom related this measure to explanatory factors. An exception is Maurseth (2005), where patent citations across and within technology fields turn out to have different implications for the renewal of patents.…”

Section: Performance Of the Commercialization Compared To Renewal Of mentioning

confidence: 99%

Innovation Performance and Government Financing

Svensson

2008

Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractExternal financing is important when inventors and small technology-based firms commercialize their inventions. However, the private information of inventors about the quality of their products causes information asymmetries and moral hazard problems. To help compensate for potentially non-existing capital markets, the Swedish Government has intervened by offering loans with different terms to firms and inventors. This paper analyzes the association between various forms of external financing and performance in profit-terms when patents are commercialized. The empirical work is based on a patent survey sent to Swedish inventors and small firms, where the response rate is 80 %. The estimations show that projects with soft government financing in the R&D-phase have a significantly inferior performance compared to projects without such financing, whereas those receiving government loans on commercial terms perform as the average. Distinguishing between governmental financing alternatives with different terms makes it possible to draw the conclusion that government failure primarily depends on bad financing terms, rather than bad project selection. A policy implication is therefore that public loans should be granted on commercial terms already in the R&D-phase of projects.

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“…The evidence in Maurseth (2001) shows that both the negative effects attributed to spillovers in the models based on additive spillover processes and the positive effects deriving from complementarities between firms' research efforts exist.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…For instance Maurseth (2001) shows that some patents receive citations across many different technology fields. He shows that the value of these patents for their owners is enhanced…”

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confidence: 99%

Spillovers Reconsidered: Analysing Economic Welfare under Complementarities in R&D

Graevenitz

2004

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe analyse economic welfare in R&D intensive industries under varying assumptions on the spillover process. The focus lies on spillover processes with complementary R&D investments such as those modelling absorptive capacity. There spillovers give rise to both negative and positive externalities. We show that the rationale for public policy intervention is strengthened where spillovers also have positive effects. This conclusion is based on the supermodularity of the spillover process and the investment game. We characterise a large class of spillover processes with similar implications for public policy. We show that results of much empirical work on absorptive capacity extend to this class of models.JEL Classification: L13, O31

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Lovely but dangerous: The impact of patent citations on patent renewal

Cited by 50 publications

References 27 publications

The puzzle of patent value indicators

The puzzle of patent value indicators

Innovation Performance and Government Financing

Spillovers Reconsidered: Analysing Economic Welfare under Complementarities in R&D

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