Low carbon strategy analysis with two competing supply chain considering carbon taxation

Yu, Wei Ping; Wang, Yan; Feng, Wenrui; Bao, Lei; Han, Ruizhu

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2022.108203

Cited by 41 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…For example, they may share part of the profits with the manufacturers under the condition of ensuring their own profitability, or the green retailer may share the R&D costs with the green manufacturer, so that each manufacturer gains more profits than the profits shared by horizontal cooperation. This is different from Yu et al (2022), who insisted that the cooperation between manufacturers will always be detrimental to retailers. This is possibly because Yu et al (2022) only considered the emission reduction competition between two chains and assumed that there is a Nash game between manufacturers.…”

Section: Effect Of the Degree Of Competition On Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 81%

“…This is different from Yu et al (2022), who insisted that the cooperation between manufacturers will always be detrimental to retailers. This is possibly because Yu et al (2022) only considered the emission reduction competition between two chains and assumed that there is a Nash game between manufacturers. However, we take the price and green level competition as well as the inequality of power structure between manufacturers into consideration, and conclude that manufacturers' cooperation can also promote the profit growth of retailers if competition degree satisfies certain conditions.…”

Section: Effect Of the Degree Of Competition On Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 81%

“…They concluded that raising carbon tax is conducive to encouraging low-carbon emission enterprises to reduce emissions. Yu et al (2022) verified that reasonable carbon tax can promote manufacturers to improve their emission reduction rate. Moreover, the two-way government intervention has also been welcomed by multitudinous scholars.…”

Section: The Government Intervention On Gscsmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…It is found that competition degree determines the integration strategy of middlemen. And Yu et al (2022) considered the greenness competition of two green products. As the government pays more and more attention to green development, considering simultaneously the price competition and green level competition between products has become the mainstream of research.…”

Section: The Impact Of Competition Degree Among Scsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Few studies consider the impact of manufacturers' cooperation in two decentralized supply chains. Yang et al (2017) and Yu et al (2022) discussed this situation, but they only explored the product greenness competition. What's more, the former only focused on the cap-and-trade scheme, while the latter didn't consider the impact of the government subsidies.…”

Section: Research Gapmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A game between green and non-green supply chains considering two-way government intervention and manufacturer competition

Shang

Wang

Xia

2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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Enterprise competition has been transformed into chain-to-chain competition, and green development is imperative under the promotion of policies. Horizontal cooperation between green and non-green manufacturers provides a new direction for the supply chain to improve its core competitiveness. This paper develops competition and cooperation models between two manufacturers for the green and non-green supply chain under two-way government intervention to explore the impact of manufacturers’ horizontal cooperation on decisions and profits of supply chain members. In particular, for a situation without cooperation, we consider a Stackelberg game between two manufacturers. Model solutions and numerical analysis have shown that: 1) Cooperation among manufacturers can not only improve their own profits, but also strengthen environmental welfare. However, cooperation will damage consumer surplus. 2) When consumers are more sensitive to product prices, manufacturers’ cooperative behavior is not conducive to retailers, but with the improvement of consumer environmental awareness, retailers will gradually support their upstream cooperation. 3) Under the simultaneous implementation of government subsidy and punishment strategies, whether green consumption can be promoted is related to the adjustment factor of government subsidies, while the relationship between the green level floor for subsidy and product greenness is affected by the adjustment factor of subsidies and manufacturers’ cooperation. 4) The impacts of fierce price competition and green level competition on supply chain members are opposite; when the price competition is moderate or the green level competition is weak, the manufacturers’ cooperation is also beneficial to the improvement of retailers’ profits. This provides ideas for the development of green supply chain, and provides a reference for the implementation of two-way government intervention policy.

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Section: Effect Of the Degree Of Competition On Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 81%

Section: Effect Of the Degree Of Competition On Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 81%

Section: The Government Intervention On Gscsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: The Impact Of Competition Degree Among Scsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Research Gapmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A game between green and non-green supply chains considering two-way government intervention and manufacturer competition

Shang

Wang

Xia

2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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Supply chain contract design considering carbon tax policy under demand information asymmetry

Cai,

Jiang,

et al. 2023

Manage Decis Econ

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Our paper constructs a low‐carbon supply chain (LSC) with a single manufacturer producing low‐carbon products and a single retailer. Assume that the retailer possesses private demand information and consider two cases: The manufacturer or the retailer determines the low‐carbon product's retail price. By constructing principal‐agent models, we obtain the optimal menu of contracts in each case. The impacts of the carbon tax rate and information asymmetry on LSC members' equilibrium solutions and expected profits are discussed. The results show that, given certain conditions, both the LSC members may obtain more expected profits under information asymmetry by introducing appropriate contracts.

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Optimal financing strategies for low‐carbon supply chains: A Stackelberg game perspective

Wang,

Zhang,

Zhang

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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This study constructs a Stackelberg game model between low‐carbon manufacturers and capital‐constrained retailers. Considering the manufacturer's financing model, the manufacturer's investment model, and the internal blended financing model, it studies the optimal wholesale price of manufacturers. This paper investigates the impact of consumers' low‐carbon preference, the financing interest rate of manufacturers, investment ratio, investment return on carbon emission reduction investment, and supply chain pricing. The conditions for low‐carbon supply chain participants to choose the best financing mode and the impact of different financing models on the performance of low‐carbon supply chains were obtained.

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Low carbon strategy analysis with two competing supply chain considering carbon taxation

Cited by 41 publications

References 54 publications

A game between green and non-green supply chains considering two-way government intervention and manufacturer competition

A game between green and non-green supply chains considering two-way government intervention and manufacturer competition

Supply chain contract design considering carbon tax policy under demand information asymmetry

Optimal financing strategies for low‐carbon supply chains: A Stackelberg game perspective

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