Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World

Ware, Lewis B; Blank, Stephen; Grinter, Lawrence E.; Klingman, Jerome W; Ofcansky, Thomas P.

doi:10.21236/ada422015

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 1 publication

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“…Relatedly, Kover (2002) describes low-intensity conflicts as those that are of lower level than the conventional wars. He added that low-intensity conflicts can also be seen as “peaceful competition among states.” Geib (2009) stated that low-intensity conflicts have “fluctuating levels of violence and sporadic outbreaks of hostilities predominate over sustained combat operations and large-scale military operations.” Ware (1988) posits that these types of conflicts will continue to exist in many parts of the world as these have become sort of “dominant form of violent confrontation.” Sood (1992) agreed that low-intensity conflicts will be the “warfare of the future.” In this study, Low-intensity conflicts are defined as those disagreements that involve petty to serious conflicts among neighbours, fellow farmers, and other people in the community. These kinds of conflicts range from simple gossip, public disturbance committed by drunk people to more serious conflicts such as land disputes, murder, and rape.…”

Section: Defining Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Low-Intensity Conflicts on Farming Communities in Mindanao, Philippines

Pergis-Lozada

Valdez-Bayogan

Orbeta

et al. 2021

Journal of Peacebuilding & Development

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Low-intensity conflicts have often been afforded lesser importance than high-intensity conflicts. Yet, low-intensity conflicts can have impacts on the ability to farm, productivity, and income. We studied the effects of low-intensity conflicts on the farming communities in two conflict vulnerable areas in Mindanao, Southern Philippines. Following a review of the economic effects of conflict with a focus on Mindanao, we surveyed farmers in low-conflict areas to assess its impact on livelihood. In 2018, farmers in “peaceful” situation differed in income from those who are in “low-conflict” situations. The mean total household income for the “low conflict” (PHP8,360 or $US155) group was significantly lower by PHP13,060 ($US242) from the “peaceful” group (PHP24,433 or $US453). This findings suggest the need for further research regarding how villages resolve conflicts informally as a way of improve government-sponsored conflict resolution efforts.

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Section: Defining Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Low-Intensity Conflicts on Farming Communities in Mindanao, Philippines

Pergis-Lozada

Valdez-Bayogan

Orbeta

et al. 2021

Journal of Peacebuilding & Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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The Deification of Mao

Grice

2018

The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency

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Eighteen Years in Lebanon and Two Intifadas: The Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. Army Operational Environment

Creed¹

2002

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Abstract"Eighteen Years in Lebanon and Two Intifadas: The Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. Army Operational Environment" by Major Richard D. Creed, Jr., Armor, seventy-eight pages.This monograph determined that the tactical and strategic experience of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) since 1981 was relevant to the future operational environment of the U.S. Army. The IDF's experiences are relevant because the Israeli Army was similarly equipped and organized to the heavy units in the U.S. Army, both then and now. Israel faced a similar full spectrum threat, and the IDF had to adapt to enemies who switched to asymmetric methods in order to overcome Israel's conventional military superiority. The IDF of 1981 paralleled the U.S. Army of the 2000 in many ways. It was a mechanized heavy force designed to conduct operations against a Soviet armed and equipped enemy. It fought and defeated some of those enemies decisively eight years previously. Beginning with the invasion of Lebanon (Operation "Peace for Galilee"), the IDF discovered that there were no peer competitors willing to fight it on its own terms. The nature of war changed for the IDF in sometimes unexpected ways, and it struggled to adapt to its changing operational environment. The IDF operational environment became much more complicated, because while it retained the old threats in the form of its Arab neighbors, it added sustained guerrilla war and civil insurrection.This paper summarized the trends and characteristics of the U.S. Army's Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and used them as the basis of comparison with the IDF operational environment. IDF operations in Lebanon and the two Palestinian Intifadas represented the trends of the IDF operational environment. All of the COE characteristics were present in the IDF operational environment in some form. Nine of the fourteen COE characteristics were present in the IDF operational environment to a significant degree. The comparison between the two operational environments was valid.Having determined that the two operational environments were similar, the remainder of the paper analyzed how the well the IDF adapted to its operational environment. The goal was to determine whether there were lessons relevant to the U.S. Army as it undergoes Transformation. The IDF was at least partially successful adapting to seven characteristics: asymmetry, constrained resources, force protection, information operations, rapidity, homeland sanctuary, and complex and urban terrain. IDF adaptation to those seven characteristics had implications from which it was possible to make recommendations about the course of Transformation. This paper recommended that the U.S. Army pay particularly close attention to the way that the IDF adapted its mechanized and armored units to survive in complex and urban terrain. The IDF's operational environment in Lebanon was so hostile that information superiority had negligible impact on force protection. Since everyone was potentially a threat, successful enemy attacks were inevita...

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Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

Effects of Low-Intensity Conflicts on Farming Communities in Mindanao, Philippines

Effects of Low-Intensity Conflicts on Farming Communities in Mindanao, Philippines

The Deification of Mao

Eighteen Years in Lebanon and Two Intifadas: The Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. Army Operational Environment

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