Low Noise Techniques

Taub, J.J.

doi:10.1109/mwsym.1982.1130590

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…5 An examination of the 100 largest companies in the S&P 500 index finds that those companies with separate CEOs and board chairs outperformed those that have dual CEO/Chairmen from 1994 to 2004. 6 Most of these critics of duality argue it allows CEOs to extract rents from firms opportunistically. On the issue of debt maturity, this means dual CEOs have greater incentives to choose long-term debt, leading to a negative relationship between duality and short-term debt.…”

Section: Ceo Duality and Debt Maturitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Excess Control Rights and Debt Maturity Structure in Family‐Controlled Firms

Shyu

Lee²

2009

Corporate Governance

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Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Numerous studies have documented that the controlling shareholders in many firms worldwide possess control rights far greater than their cash flow rights. The excess of control rights over cash flow rights, hereafter referred to as excess control rights, leads to potential conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders. The purpose of this study is to investigate the link between excess control rights and debt maturity structure in familycontrolled firms, a topic that has yet to be addressed in the literature. We attempt to examine how controlling shareholders exploit the excess control rights in making debt maturity decisions at the expense of minority shareholders. Research Findings/Insights: Using panel data for 611 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2006, we found that a robust, significantly negative link exists between excess control rights and short-term debt. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the divergence of control rights from cash flow rights offers an opportunity for the controlling shareholders in family-controlled firms to entrench themselves and expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. Furthermore, by examining board structure, CEO duality, and ownership structure, we show how these factors work together with excess control rights to help determine the debt maturity structure in the sample firms.c org_755 611..628 Theoretical/Academic Implications: The theoretical implication of this study is that corporate governance issues such as excess control rights in family-controlled firms are important in corporate decisions, and that studies on these issues enrich our understanding of corporate decision-making. Further studies along this line of corporate decisions -such as investment, leverage structure, and dividend policy -will be instrumental in the development of a comprehensive theory of how corporate governance influences a firm's valuation. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The fact that short-term debt is negatively linked to excess control rights suggests that short-term debt providers are an effective monitor for constraining entrenchment and expropriation activities of controlling shareholders. Investors who seek to invest in family-controlled firms, especially in, but not limited to, emerging markets, can benefit from being aware of this link and taking it into account in making investment decisions. Many corporate governance scorecards have emerged over the years to provide market participants a measure of a firm's corporate governance practice's soundness. In view of this study's findings, adding a new factor in measuring the monitoring level the providers of short-term debt can potentially increase its usefulness. Finally, policy makers, especially those in emerging markets, pursuing continuous reform to improve the functioning of their capital markets by improving the corporate governance landscape, should heed the findings and the aforementioned practical implications. This study ...

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Section: Ceo Duality and Debt Maturitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Excess Control Rights and Debt Maturity Structure in Family‐Controlled Firms

Shyu

Lee²

2009

Corporate Governance

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“…On one hand, researchers can investigate the disclaimer language impact on the auditor behavior such as auditor turnover, audit fees and audit opinion. Previously PWC was blamed for ignoring disclaimer language in the AC report of AIG which was considered as warnings (Taub, 2005). On the other hand, a qualitative approach can be taken to extend our research.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Disclaimer language sends signals to the readers that a wrongdoing may be currently taking place (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975). For example, American International Group’s (AIG) AC used disclaimer language in their report stating that they cannot promise that the accounting is according to GAAP and that the external auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC), is independent (Taub, 2005). Later when AIG started to experience financial difficulties, the disclaimer language was referred to as a signal of wrongdoing and PWC was sued for disregarding that signal sent from the AC members via their disclaimer language.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Disclaimer language is characterized in being legalistic, complex and difficult to understand (Directors and Chief Risk Officers Group [DCRO], 2018). In some cases, it can infer to the readers that problems exist but are undisclosed or undiscovered (Taub, 2005) which can lead to negative consequences in respect to the investors’ perceptions. Accordingly, investors will require a higher return on their investment leading to a higher cost of equity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Disclaimer language in US banks’ audit committee reports: determinants and consequences

Naaman

Sahyoun

2021

MEDAR

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate the determinants and consequences of using disclaimer language in the banks’ audit committee (AC) reports. This study aims to analyze the factors tempting AC members of banks to disclose disclaimer language in the AC reports and the effect of such language on the cost of equity. Design/methodology/approach The data cover the period from 2006 to 2015 and considers the top US bank holding companies. Voluntary disclosure in the AC report is manually coded by using a scoring grid. Multivariate regression analysis is mainly used in the study. Findings The findings suggest that the ACs are using the disclaimer language to protect themselves when disclosing a high level of voluntary information that describes their oversight activities or to reduce their liability exposure due to lower financial reporting quality. The findings also reveal that investors are requiring a higher return on their investments whenever ACs use disclaimer language in their reports. Originality/value The AC report provides useful information to shareholders who evaluate the AC’s performance and accordingly vote for or against AC members on annual basis. The paper sheds lights on the motives and consequences of disclaimer language in the ACs report. Thus, the study benefits shareholders by providing empirical evidence in regard to the usage of disclaimer language. Also, the findings benefit industry, corporate governance organizations, standard setters and regulators that analyze AC disclosures and issue recommendations or new standards for improving those disclosures.

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“…Further, the SEC has suggested that implementation of Section 404 should be tailored to the nature and size of the company to which they relate. 7 The target company in these first two cases would be expected to have made substantial effort to comply with SOX requirements. However, successful compliance with SOX is not a given, and many issues remain to be investigated.…”

Section: Manda Landscapementioning

confidence: 99%