Luck as an epistemic notion

Abstract

Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent's epistemic situation. According to the proposed account, an event is lucky for an agent only if the agent was not in a position to know that the event would occur. It is also explored whether this new account threatens the anti-luck program in epistemology. It is argued that although not detrimental to the anti-luck program, the epistemic account of luck sets certain important limits to its scope and feasibility.

Strokes of Luck

“…The discovery no longer seems lucky to Vincent, but it still seems lucky for him (cf. Steglich‐Petersen , 365ff.). Thus, the basis for our intuition that the discovery is lucky for Vincent can't just be that it seems lucky to him.…”

Does luck exclude knowledge or certainty?

“…Modal accounts fail because even modally robust events can be lucky (Lackey 2006;2008). But again, epistemic accounts can handle modally robust events, since such events need not be known or probable in light of one's evidence (Steglich-Petersen 2010). And as argued by Stoutenburg (forthcoming), epistemic accounts can handle all of Hales' (2016) recent counterexamples involving lucky necessities (more on these below), skilful luck, 4 and diachronic luck.…”

“…It has recently been proposed that this improbability condition is best understood in epistemic terms. Two different versions of this proposal have been advanced.According to my own proposal (Steglich-Petersen 2010), whether an event is lucky for some agent depends on whether the agent was in a position to know that the event would occur. And according to Stoutenburg (2015; forthcoming), whether an event is lucky for an agent depends on whether the event was guaranteed or certain to occur in light of the agent's evidence.…”

“…Two different versions of the epistemic account have been proposed. According to my own proposal (Steglich-Petersen 2010), whether an event is lucky for some agent depends on whether the agent was in a position to know that the event would occur. To be more precise, I have proposed the following necessary condition on luck (Steglich-Petersen 2010: 369):…”

“…Objective probability accounts fail because even predetermined events can be lucky for an agent (Pritchard 2005: 126-27). Epistemic accounts can handle predetermined events, since such events need not be known or probable in light of one's evidence (Steglich-Petersen 2010). Modal accounts fail because even modally robust events can be lucky (Lackey 2006;2008).…”