Luck, propositional perception, and the Entailment Thesis

Ranalli, Chris

doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0323-z

Cited by 18 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Ultimately, I think not, but the argument of this paper doesn't require any sort of demonstration of the incompatibility of relationalist with representationalist 23 McGinn (1999) seems to have thought that seeing that a is F is a matter of being visually aware of a fact, but I find French (2012) and Ranalli's (2014) arguments to the contrary to be persuasive. For further arguments that we don't see facts, see Moltmann (2013).…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 74%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).

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Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 74%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…9 For arguments that this kind of skill is what grounds effective conceptual analysis, see Ludwig (2007). 10 See Moon (2013) argues that remembering requires belief; and Ranalli (2014) and French (2012) argue that perceiving requires believing. 11 Some may be uncomfortable with my use of (B) due to its similarity to the Liar sentence ('This sentence is false').…”

Section: Appendix B: Self-reference and (Kr)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See Moon () argues that remembering requires belief; and Ranalli () and French () argue that perceiving requires believing.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Beliefless Knowing

Silva

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Orthodox epistemology tells us that knowledge requires belief. While there has been resistance to orthodoxy on this point, the orthodox position has been ably defended and continues to be widely endorsed. In what follows, I aim to undermine the belief requirement on knowledge. I first show that awareness does not require belief. Next, I turn my attention to the relation between knowledge and awareness, showing that awareness entails knowledge in a certain range of cases and thus that the cases of awareness without belief that I discuss are also cases of knowledge without belief. Throughout I draw attention to the fact that these are not isolated cases and that beliefless knowledge is a rather common phenomenon. I conclude by arguing that beliefless knowledge is consistent with the idea that all knowledge is grounded in belief and the idea that knowledge is essentially a representational state.

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“…See, e.g. Cassam, 2007;Dretske, 1969;Goldman, 1986;McDowell, 2011;Pritchard, 2005Pritchard, , 2014Ranalli, 2014;and Williamson, 2000, for some discussion. 41 See, e.g.…”

Section: An Implicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic and non‐Epistemic Theories of Remembering

James

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes.

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Luck, propositional perception, and the Entailment Thesis

Cited by 18 publications

References 43 publications

How and Why Knowledge is First

How and Why Knowledge is First

Beliefless Knowing

Epistemic and non‐Epistemic Theories of Remembering

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